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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

29 APR 1997

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Mr. Michael Evans
The National Security Archive
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Dear Mr. Evans:

This responds to your October 22, 1996, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (#960848DOD106). Our November 4, 1996, interim response refers.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs has provided the enclosed record as responsive to your request. Portions of the document contain information concerning intelligence activities, intelligence sources, or methods; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. Major General John Hall, USAF, Director, an Initial Denial Authority, has determined that this information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Sections 1.5 (c) and (d). Accordingly, this material has been withheld pursuant to 5 USC §552(b)(1).

You have the right to appeal the decision to withhold this information. Any such appeal should offer justification to support an additional release and must be received in this Directorate within 60 calendar days of this letter's date.

Fees associated with the processing of this request have been waived in this instance.

Sincerely,

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

#867

Enclosure:
As stated



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ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS



USD(P)
Visit to China: 25 - 28 June

Meeting/Events Book

WORKING BOOK

~~SECRET~~

REDACTED PER FOIA.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
4/15/97

USD(P) China Visit: 25-28 June

Events Book

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RETRANSMITTAL OF USDAO BEIJING MSG 0559 DTG 180840Z JUN 96 PER YOUR REQUEST

PASS: (U) PERSONAL FOR MR. SLOCOMBE (USDP); INFO SECDEF FOR DR. CAMPBELL AND COL EIKENBERRY (ISA-AP); CINCPAC FOR ADM PREUHER (J00), MG STEELE (J5) AND RADM JACOBY (J2); SECSTATE MR. WIEDEMANN AND MR. BADER (EAP); JCS MG KING (J2) AND BG FOGLESONG (J5); DIA FOR LTG HUGHES (DR), BG KERRICK (CC) AND DR. FONTANA (DH-3A) FROM BG MIKE BYRNES.

SUBJ: YOUR VISIT TO CHINA (U)

1. (C) AMBASSADOR SASSER AND USDAO BEIJING LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT TO BEIJING. WE SEE THIS VISIT AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THE SINO-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. YOUR VISIT COMES AT A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TIME IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AS BOTH SIDES ARE IN THE MIDST OF ASSESSING THE EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR AND ARE DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH EACH OTHER IN THE NEAR TERM.

2. (C) WHILE THE U.S. POSITION HAS EVOLVED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TOWARD A ROUGH CONSENSUS ON CHINA POLICY, THE MAIN CHARACTERISTIC OF CHINA'S CURRENT APPROACH TO THE U.S. IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHARPLY CONTRASTING VIEWS. THESE CONTRASTING VIEWS ARE MANIFEST IN VACILLATING POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE U.S. ON ANY GIVEN DAY ONE CAN PICK UP CHINESE PRESS ARTICLES HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AND OTHER ARTICLES WHICH ARE MUCH MORE MODERATE IN TONE. I BELIEVE THESE MIXED AND CONTRARY MESSAGES REFLECT AN ONGOING DEBATE WITHIN THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY ON THE FOCUS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARDS CHINA AND, IN TURN, HOW CHINA SHOULD RELATE TO THE U.S.

5. (C) BACKGROUND.

A. (C) CHINESE STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS. FOLLOWING THE DENG XIAOPING-INITIATED STRATEGIC SHIFT IN 1985, CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNERS HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF JOLTS WHICH HAVE LEFT STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN A STATE OF CONFUSION. IN THE 1960'S THE PRC ADOPTED A NORTHWARD ORIENTED, LARGE SCALE, NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIO IN WHICH CHINA WOULD BE ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE. IN THE LATE 1980'S, CHINA REFOCUSED ON A SOUTHWARD THREAT OF LOCAL, LIMITED WARS WITH A GREATER OFFENSIVE CONTENT THAN THE PRE-1985 STRATEGY. EVENTS SUCH AS TIANANMEN, THE GULF WAR, AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE COMBINED TO DISRUPT THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS. THE LACK OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT AND THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP FOCUS ON THE MILITARY COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY HAVE TENDED TO INHIBIT STRATEGIC THINKING.

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C. (C) THE PLA'S STATED MILITARY STRATEGY IS THE VAGUELY DEFINED STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENSE. SOMEWHERE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF ACTIVE DEFENSE IS THE SO CALLED STRATEGY OF LOCAL WARS. THIS IMPLIES A SHIFT FROM A CONTINENTAL FOCUS TO A MARITIME FOCUS. IF, AS IT APPEARS, THIS SHIFT IS ACTUALIZED, IT WILL MARK A

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STRATEGIC REVOLUTION. THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE THAT SUCH A STRATEGY IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. THERE HAS BEEN MORE FOCUS RECENTLY ON AIR AND MARITIME MODERNIZATION, WITH POSSIBLE END GOAL OF DEVELOPING A LIMITED POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY. OVERRIDING THIS ACTIVE DEFENSE AND LOCAL WAR CONCEPT IS THE PLA'S EMPHASIS ON OPERATING IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT. U.S. SUCCESSES DURING THE GULF WAR AGAINST SOVIET STYLE FORCES, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICS SHOOK THE PLA TO ITS ROOTS AND RESULTED IN A MAJOR EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING FOR ITS FORCES.

E. (U) WHILE CHINA'S STATUS AS A GREAT NATION IS INCREASINGLY APPARENT, IT IS STILL LEARNING HOW TO SHOULDER THE BURDENS OF A GREAT NATION AND HOW TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY. WE DO NOT SEE CHINA AS A THREAT, BUT WE BELIEVE CHINA MUST BE MORE OPEN AND SENSITIVE TO THE SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF ITS NEIGHBORS. THIS POINT NEEDS TO BE EMPHASIZED TO YOUR CHINESE HOSTS. THE CHINESE APPEAR OBLIVIOUS TO THE IMPACT OF THEIR SECURITY AND MILITARY ACTIONS ON OTHERS IN THE REGION. CHINA IS LESS THAN OPEN IN ITS EXPLANATION OF ITS GROWING DEFENSE BUDGET, MILITARY MODERNIZATION, AND MILITARY STRATEGY. THIS LACK OF OPENNESS OFTEN RESULTS IN GREATER SUSPICION THAN NECESSARY.

- THE USG, INCLUDING DOD, SEEKS TO ENGAGE CHINA AND TO COOPERATE WITH CHINA IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY STRUCTURES AS A RESPONSIBLE POWER. THERE IS NO U.S. POLICY TO CONTAIN CHINA.

- BOTH MILITARIES AND NATIONS HAVE COMMON INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PEACE, PROVIDING A STABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND CONTROLLING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

- THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OR TWO COUNTRIES IS A NORMAL AND SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND FOSTERED. THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP MUST BE CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND RECIPROCITY.

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- WE APPRECIATE THE PLA'S SUPPORT TO OUR VISITING
DELEGATIONS AND TO OTHER DOD PROGRAMS SUCH AS MIA
ACCOUNTING OPERATIONS.

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3A) FROM BG MIKE BYRNES.

SUBJ: YOUR VISIT TO CHINA (U)

RELATIONSHIP. AS THE SECDEF SO APTLY POINTED OUT "IT
TAKES TWO TO TANGO." VERY RESPECTFULLY, MIKE BYRNES,
DATT BEIJING.

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June 11, 1996

Chinese Strategic Perspectives in the Wake of the March 1996 Military Exercises

The following points presenting Chinese views and assessments of a broad range of security issues are based on our discussions in Beijing May 27 - June 1, 1996. Our visit was hosted by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) under the Ministry of State Security and the State Council which has been our host for annual visits to China for more than a decade. We met with about two dozen Chinese civilian and military officials and foreign policy institute experts (see annex), many of them for private conversations.

Sino-American Relations

- Chinese officials and foreign policy analysts continue to stress that the two countries have broad strategic interests in common and that the development of relations will affect the whole world. Differences are over smaller issues that don't affect national interests, they insist. Lack of dialogue, especially at the higher levels, has resulted in a lack of mutual trust and, even worse, growing suspicions about each others intentions.
- According to Chinese experts, there is agreement in the Chinese leadership that Sino-American ties are important and that Beijing should strive to achieve a stable, normal relationship. They acknowledge, however, that there is a debate about how to handle relations with the United States. Some leaders and senior officials advocate a tougher approach and others propose making concessions on issues of lesser importance that do not affect Chinese sovereignty, such as human rights, proliferation and trade. More frequent summit meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders will "help avoid a tug-of-war among our agencies," said Liu Xiaoming, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs.
- The Chinese have not altered their basic estimate reached last Fall that U.S. policy toward China is "engagement with elements of containment." According to CICIR Director Shen Qurong, "factors like the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S. policies toward the Korean peninsula, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the proposed U.S. 'preventive defense' policy, all make China wonder if the containment elements in the engagement policy are not growing stronger."
- The speeches by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher and Defense Secretary Perry were viewed as generally positive and as evidence that senior U.S. officials have recognized the importance of China and Sino-American relations. The Chinese are especially pleased by the early announcement of MFN renewal for China by President Clinton and by Christopher's proposal to hold regular summits.
- A change in the formulation used by Christopher as to what kind of China the U.S. wants to see has evoked concern among experts and officials who worry that the U.S. no longer wants a "strong" China. In addition, the word "secure" is viewed as having a dual meaning--the negative connotation is that the U.S. wants to ensure that China can't pose a threat to others. Doubts were also raised by the President's questioning of whether China is a factor for stability or instability in the region.

- The Chinese view favorably the Anthony Lake-Liu Huaqiu channel for discussions on strategic issues and look forward to the next round. MFA official Liu Xiaoming lamented that the Lake-Liu discussions in March had not been followed up with in-depth discussions emphasizing shared strategic interests, but rather that both sides have continued to focus on differences over proliferation and trade.
- Chinese officials say that if an agreement is reached on IPR and the President's decisions to unconditionally renew MFN is not overturned by Congress, then prospects for stabilizing relations this year will be good. - Experts are hopeful that China will not be a contentious issue in the presidential campaign. Many analysts referred to private communications from President Clinton to President Jiang Zemin as the basis of their cautiously optimistic prognosis for bilateral ties.
- Analysts see an emerging convergence of views between moderate Democrats and Republicans on the need to develop a more cooperative relationship with China. They are cautiously optimistic that after the presidential elections, U.S. domestic politics will be less of a hindrance to maintaining stable relations than it has been since 1989.
- Experts and officials warned against new U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. They strongly criticized the recent sale of 465 Stingers, objecting especially to the quantity, and expressed concern about future sales that would upgrade Taiwan's early warning and ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Lee Teng-hui's Inaugural Speech and Cross-Strait Relations

- Many experts and officials criticized Lee's inaugural address for not mentioning "one China" or the "three links" and continuing to promote Taiwan's international space. Most experts said Lee's proposal to visit the Mainland to meet with Jiang Zemin was "insincere" because he attached conditions--the needs of the "country" and the support of the people--that were intended to sound reasonable while providing grounds for rejecting such a visit. Experts also rejected Lee's endorsement of reunification in the 21st Century, calling such words "empty talk" because the next century is "a long time."
- Despite Lee's declaration that independence for Taiwan is impossible, there is agreement among the Chinese, including the leadership, that Lee's ultimate objective is independence. PLA General Staff analyst Colonel Li Qinggong asserted that "Chinese leading bodies have a deep understanding of Lee Teng-hui's attitude and policy" and see no fundamental change. Although Lee used some "new terms" in his speech, Li Qinggong said, "I don't think he will change in the future . . . so from this viewpoint, China's policy toward Taiwan will continue as before."
- Some experts made a distinction between Lee's pursuit of "two Chinas" and "independence" for Taiwan. Yu Keli, deputy director of the CASS Taiwan Institute noted that "Lee Teng-hui is now pursuing "splittism," not independence" because a declaration of independence would provoke a military attack from the Mainland. "This does not mean that Lee Teng-hui opposes independence," Yu Keli stated, but only that it can't gain recognition for independence in the near term.
- A minority of experts cited positive elements in Lee Teng-hui's inaugural address, noting that he had not insisted that the Mainland renounce the use of force against Taiwan and had ruled out independence for the island. These analysts say that Lee accepts the existence of one China, but not the PRC version of one China.

- Beijing still has a wait-and-see posture toward Lee Teng-hui. Ma Zhengang said that even though Lee had "not said beautiful words, we will watch to see what he does." According to Yu Keli, "see what he does" means that Beijing will watch "to see if the actions he takes are really in accord with reunification." There is deep suspicion that Lee Teng-hui will continue to practice "flexible diplomacy" and promote two Chinas in the international arena. Experts say that there is room for Beijing to be tactically flexible in its policy toward Taiwan, but that strategically, China will base its policy on Jiang Zemin's 8 points laid out in January 1995 and on the one China policy.
- Chinese officials and experts on Taiwan insisted that Lee Teng-hui cease his "spittist" activities and accept the principle of "one China" before Beijing will agree to resume the Wang-Gu bilateral talks between Taiwan and the Mainland. A minority view was expressed by CICIR analyst Chu Shulong, however, who maintained that China needs to resume the talks for its own interests and would do so in the next few months as long as Lee does not take provocative steps aimed at promoting two Chinas.
- Objective factors for improving cross-Strait relations remain, according to experts and officials. Taipei cannot sustain tension in relations with the Mainland for long. The pending reversion of Hong Kong to China is viewed as a source of Mainland leverage over Taipei. To achieve Lee Teng-hui's goal of having Taiwan function as the hub of a regional business operations center, experts also noted, he must improve ties with Beijing. There is optimism among some Taiwan experts that relations can be improved and a Jiang-Lee meeting attained in the next few years.
- A visit by Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. or to Japan, bigger steps toward independence, or major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are some of the actions that could trigger Beijing to resume military pressure on the island.

Consequences of China's Military Exercises

- The vast majority of Chinese analysts and officials views China's military exercises as both necessary and successful. Experts acknowledge that there were some negative consequences for China. Nevertheless, they maintain that there is agreement in China that on balance the positive results were greater and more significant than the negative results. Most Chinese officials and analysts also reject the thesis that the March missile firings were counterproductive to Beijing's political objectives and insist that the positive results were achieved by the series of military exercises that began in July 1995 and culminated in late March 1996.
- Interagency meetings were held prior to the March military exercises to discuss the missile targets as well as other issues and similar meetings were convened subsequent to the exercises to assess their outcome. According to CICIR analyst Chu Shulong who participated in these meetings, it was deemed necessary to select targets close to Taiwan's ports to send a message that the PRC has "the capability to blockade Taiwan and to reach any targets in Taiwan we want to reach."
- Positive consequences of the exercises cited by Chinese analysts and officials include: 1) China showed its determination to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent and thus warned other countries against interfering in China's internal affairs; 2) the military exercises and missile firings demonstrated that Beijing has a wide range of military options, including the ability to blockade Taiwan's ports and to strike targets anywhere on the island and thus proved that China has the ability to undermine Taiwan's economic and social stability; 3) support for independence on Taiwan has declined as indicated by a sharp drop in the popular vote for the DPP to 21%, compelling the DPP to revise its program to reflect a more cautious approach to independence; 4) the U.S. and Japan will likely not permit Lee Teng-hui to visit this year; 5) Lee himself has been restrained to some extent from seeking greater international space; and 6) Taiwan is now seriously considering opening the "three links" with the Mainland.

- Perceived negative consequences of the exercises include: 1) increased anti-Communist sentiment in Taiwan; and 2) greater consideration to the China factor in the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance. A few experts privately assert that the March missile tests were not necessary since they did not significantly influence Taiwan's domestic political situation and in fact increased the number of votes for Lee Teng-hui.
- Chinese analysts reject the conclusion that countries other than the U.S. reacted strongly to the exercises and that regional states are now more concerned about possible aggressive actions by China against their interests. They maintain that the Southeast Asian nations appreciate that Beijing's exercises were conducted in China's territorial waters and therefore they are not more worried about Chinese use of force in the South China Sea. Analysts contended that Southeast Asian countries, South Korea, and even Japan were very careful in their statements about China's military exercises and did not strongly oppose them.

U.S. Carrier Deployments

- Liu Huaqiu's discussions with senior U.S. officials in March and private communications to Chinese leaders from President Clinton reassured Beijing that the U.S. did not seek a military confrontation with China and had not changed its policy of "strategic ambiguity." CICIR President Shen Qurong noted that "since March this year, the U.S. government has passed many messages to China giving us the sense that the U.S. understood China's actions although it expressed concern." Experts cited the movement of the Independence 60 km. away from the exercise area once the maneuvers began as a signal that the U.S. appreciated that Beijing only sought to attain political, not military objectives vis-a-vis Taiwan.
- The deployment of U.S. carriers off China's coast during its March military exercises was viewed by the PLA, however, as "a first step of new U.S. involvement in the Taiwan issue," according to CICIR's Chu Shulong. The majority of experts has concluded that if China attacks Taiwan, the U.S. will be involved militarily. This conclusion is also supported by Beijing's analysis of the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance and by the judgment that the U.S. has gotten over the Vietnam Syndrome.
- Only a small minority of PLA experts contends that the U.S. decision to keep the carriers a certain distance from the military exercises indicates that even if China used military force against Taiwan, the U.S. would not necessarily get involved militarily in the conflict.
- Reasons cited by Chinese analysts for the U.S. deployment of two carrier battle groups to the region include: 1) to show Congress the administration's resolve and strengthen President Clinton's domestic political position; 2) to demonstrate U.S. credibility to American regional allies; 3) to show U.S. backing for Taiwan's democratic achievements; and 4) to boost the vote for Lee Teng-hui.
- Many Chinese, especially in the PLA, have come to see a Sino-U.S. military confrontation between over Taiwan as inevitable. This assessment is based on analysis of Lee Teng-hui's commitment to independence, the Mainland's limited room to maneuver on the Taiwan issue, and the likelihood that the U.S. will come to the defense of Taiwan.
- Chinese experts insist that Beijing would confront the United States if it intervened to prevent the mainland from taking over Taiwan. "If war breaks out, the Taiwan Strait would become a war zone and if the U.S. sent ships into the Strait, the PLA would have the right to attack," warned Zhou Jihua, a retired Academy of Military Sciences researcher and Japan expert.

- Various PLA units are discussing what capabilities China should develop in preparation for a military takeover of Taiwan and a possible military confrontation with the United States. Chinese analysts contend that the PLA will increase its capability to inflict damage on U.S. naval forces and support bases.

Sino-U.S. Military Ties

- The PLA has revised its assessment of Defense Secretary Perry's intentions toward China as a result of both his statements in response to Chinese military exercises and his decision to deploy two carrier battlegroups near Taiwan. Chinese experts say that Perry showed his true colors; that he was never really a friend of China's and that Beijing was deceived by him in the past. Some say that this is irreversible while others say that the Chinese people like to forgive.
- In considering rescheduling Chi Haotian's visit to the U.S., the PLA attaches great importance to reciprocity. According to General Staff G-2 analyst Li Qinggong, who was involved in making preparations for the canceled visit last spring, it will be difficult to arrange Chi's return visit if a meeting at the White House with President Clinton is not on the agenda. Li also noted that an improvement in the political atmosphere between the two countries would be necessary before a visit by Chi Haotian could be rescheduled. "I don't think that under such political conditions in U.S.-China relations as exist now that it would be appropriate for Chi to visit the United States," he said.
- Several Chinese noted that the cancellation of the Chi Haotian visit was a humiliation for China. "We think that when the U.S. sent carriers to threaten us, we should have canceled the visit," said CICIR analyst Chu Shulong. "But we bore the burden of still wanting to go ahead with the visit and then the U.S. canceled it. Now we have to change the mood" before it can be rescheduled," he said. Chu also asserted that due to the revised assessment of Defense Secretary Perry, only a minority in the PLA will "push for a Chi visit to the U.S.," although he noted that the final decision will be made by Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

- There is widespread concern about the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Chinese have concluded that China is at least a factor, if not the target of the redefinition of the alliance. They are especially worried about the Japanese SDF supporting American forces in a joint response to China's use of force against Taiwan. Possible revision of the Japanese constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense and the impact of the strengthening of the alliance on Japan's defense strategy are also sources of concern.
- Beijing's apprehension about the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance was expressed by Ma Zhengang, deputy director of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office. "I don't think it is beneficial to the region if Japan becomes a military power," Ma said. "The redefinition of the alliance will help Japan in some way to move forward toward this goal. It is hard to say that it will pose a threat to China or to the Asia-Pacific region, but we have to watch. Is it defensive? What will Japan's new role be? Very personally, I don't see the benefit in redefining the alliance. I don't know how much harm it will do."

- Concern about the meaning and significance of the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects an underlying debate in China. The majority of officials and analysts maintains that on specific issues the U.S. and Japan will collaborate to contain China or "check" China but that their strategies on the whole are not aimed at this objective and could not achieve it in any case. A large minority of experts is convinced that the U.S.-Japan alliance is already being refocused to primarily target and contain China. A small minority of experts argues that recent developments in the alliance are likely to be transitory. These analysts contend that the U.S.-Japan-China triangular relationship is like a pendulum that has swung to one extreme of close cooperation between Washington and Tokyo but that it will soon start to come back toward the middle as U.S.-Japan conflicts over trade and other issues reemerge and could eventually swing toward close Sino-American relations at Japan's expense.
- Despite growing apprehension that the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty may be potentially damaging to Chinese interests, Beijing is not poised to declare its opposition to the alliance or to the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the Western Pacific. A rift in the alliance is still judged as likely to be dangerous to China and to regional stability. Nevertheless, there is growing doubt that the alliance will continue to restrain the expansion of Japan's conventional military capabilities and its security role in the region.
- There is increasing apprehension about U.S. and Japanese development and deployment of a TMD system. CICIR America expert Chu Shulong maintained that "the target of TMD in the region is certainly Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons, not North Korea." Chinese military researchers express concern that a sea-based TMD system could be used by Japan to defend Taiwan from an attack by Chinese conventionally-armed missiles in the event that Beijing resorts to use of force to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent. Nuclear scientists and arms controllers worry that deployment of TMD by Japan could neutralize as much as 80% of China's strategic nuclear missiles, thus endangering Beijing's deterrent. Should Tokyo deploy such a "shield," the Chinese worry that it might later acquire a "sword," that is, develop and deploy nuclear weapons.

Multilateral Regional Defense Dialogue

- Civilian experts and officials say there is little enthusiasm for a multilateral defense dialogue in the current environment. Improvement in relations between North and South Korea and as well as in Sino-American relations were cited as prerequisites for establishing a Northeast Asian defense forum on security issues. A U.S.-Japan-China trilateral defense minister dialogue was rejected as likely to increase regional apprehension about Japan and China, especially in Korea, and as a potential forum for the U.S and Japan to jointly pressure China.
- A military analyst from the General Staff G-2 department insisted, however, that the PLA views multilateral talks among regional defense ministers as beneficial to China. Li Qinggong indicated that Chinese military leaders are "eager to go the outside world, but they meet resistance from the MFA." Li suggested a three step process to promote trilateral defense dialogue among the U.S., Japan and China: first, non-governmental discussions among scholars; second, concrete preparatory work by lower-level military officials; and finally, defense minister talks.

Korea

- Beijing views the economic situation in North Korea as deteriorating, but estimates that there will not be widespread famine and sees no imminent danger of political instability. According to Ma Zhengang, "there won't be a collapse. The North Korean people have the capability to endure the situation. Kim Jong Il is in control of the whole situation. He has the full support of the army and the party. He can control the whole situation." Chinese officials add that China's domestic food needs dictate that Beijing can only supply a limited amount of grain to North Korea.
- Chinese officials reiterated that the whether four-party talks on the Korean peninsula can be realized depends on North Korea. They are uncertain whether the North Koreans will support it, but warn that "if they feel threatened, then they won't proceed." Officials also repeated Beijing's positions that it is better to have North-South talks first and that the armistice should be replaced by new peace agreement.

Russia

- Yeltsin's last-minute proposal prior to the summit to characterize the Sino-Russian relationship as a "strategic partnership" came as a surprise to the Chinese side but was not objectionable. Some Chinese experts said that they had expected the two sides to privately agree to the substance of a strategic partnership without publicly announcing it in the communiqué. They insisted, however, that the Russian and Chinese sides do not substantially disagree on the significance and objectives of the "strategic partnership."
- Chinese analysts describe the term "strategic" as having two elements: 1) the adoption of a long-term perspective by both Russia and China in developing their relations; and 2) the expansion of cooperation from bilateral to international issues. The summit also signaled the two countries' intention to develop closer economic and defense/industrial relations.
- Both China and Russia view the "strategic partnership" as a means of getting leverage over the United States and improving their relations with the U.S., according to Chinese experts. At the same time, noted CICIR analyst Chu Shulong, "the words are a warning to the United States that if the U.S. treats us too badly, we have other alternatives."
- Expansion of the relationship from bilateral concerns to regional and international issues will result in the Chinese giving consideration to Russia's interests where they might not have done so in the past. CICIR President Shen Qurong said, for example, that Russia's opposition to being excluded from the proposal to hold four-party talks would have to be taken into account. Similarly, experts indicated that Russia should be included in any multilateral defense dialogues in Northeast Asia.
- Beijing estimates that Yeltsin is likely to win the presidential elections and that his odds will improve as the elections get closer. They predict, however, that no candidate will obtain a majority in the first vote in June. During the April Yeltsin-Jiang summit, Jiang endorsed Yeltsin's reelection bid as well as Russia's opposition to NATO expansion.

*Annex: Officials and Analysts met with
During May 27 – June 1, 1996 Talks in Beijing*

State Council Foreign Affairs Office

Ma Zhengang, Deputy Director

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Liu Xiaoming, Director, Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs

Foreign Affairs College, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Su Ge, Dean and Professor

China Institute of Contemporary International Relations

Shen Qurong, Director

Song Baoxian, Deputy Director

Chu Shulong, Acting Chief, America Division

Liu Jiangyong, Chief of Northeast Asia Division

PLA General Staff Department

Colonel Li Qinggong, Military Intelligence (G-2)

Foundation for International Strategic Studies

Peng Hongwei, Deputy Director

Zhang Tuosheng, Director of Research

Zhang Yu, Wu Baiyi, analysts

Institute of World Information, State Information Center, State Council

Cui Liru, Deputy Director

Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Zhao Jieqi, Deputy Director and former military attaché to Japan

Zhou Jihua, Professor

CASS Institute of American Studies

Zhang Yebai, Chief, American Foreign Policy Division

CASS Institute of Eastern European, Russian and Central Eurasian Studies

Ni Xiaoquan, Senior Researcher

CASS Institute of Taiwan Studies

Yu Keli, Deputy Director

Association for Relations Across the Strait (ARATS)

Lin Jiasen

Center for Peace and Development Studies

Xin Qi, Researcher

Chinese Society for Strategy and Management Research (CSSMR)

Gao E, CSSMR Vice Chairman and Deputy Director, Center for International Studies

Song Zongyue, former research fellow, Academy of Military Sciences

He Fang, former Director and Senior Research Fellow, CASS Institute of Japanese Studies, and former Deputy Director, China Center for International Studies

a/o June 21

Itinerary
USD(P) Slocombe
visit to
Beijing, China
25-28 June 1996

Attire: Arrival/departure and all official meetings: Coat & tie / Class "A" uniform

TUESDAY, 25 JUNE

- 1940 Arrive Beijing Airport, Old Terminal; met by PLA Maj Gen Zhan Maohai, Deputy, Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Bureau and BG Michael Byrnes, DATT
- 1950 Proceed to VIP room for brief discussion with Maj Gen Zhan
- 2010 Depart for Kempinski Hotel
- 2030 Arrive Kempinski Hotel; personal time
- 2130 Proceed to control room for delegation meeting
- 2215 RON

WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE

(Note: Casual attire appropriate until after lunch)

- 0615 Optional walk or jog tour of early morning Beijing w/ Gen Byrnes & Capt Reddinger
- 0700 Buffet breakfast in hotel restaurant with select delegation members
- 0800 Depart hotel; travel to US Embassy

Itinerary (Con't) page 2

- 0830 Arrive US Embassy; proceed to Country Team meeting hosted by Ambassador Sasser
- 0930 Depart Embassy for local sightseeing at the Forbidden City & Tiananmen Square
- 1145 No-host Beijing duck lunch at Tuanjiehu Duck Rest
- 1300 Depart for Kempinski Hotel
- 1315 Arrive hotel; personal time (change to coat & tie/Class "A" uniform)
- 1400 Depart hotel for PRC MND Foreign Affairs Bureau
- 1430 Arrive FAB; proceed to private meeting with Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (attendees: USD(P), BG Byrnes, Lt Gen Xiong, Sr. Col Xu Junping, Director, OCEAN & Americas Division, FAB; two interpreters)
- 1455 Proceed to Plenary Session
- 1500 Plenary Session
(Note: Lt Gen Xiong will give opening remarks to delegation USD(P) will be invited to continue session with his remarks)
- 1730 Plenary Session concludes; personal time at PRC MND Foreign Affairs Bureau
- 1800 Proceed to Welcome Banquet hosted by Lt Gen Xiong at PRC MND Foreign Affairs Bureau
Note: toast & gift exchange
- 2000 Depart MND
- 2030 Arrive Kempinski Hotel; RON

THURSDAY, 27 JUNE

- 0600-0630 Optional walk or jog to Jing Shan Park (overlooks T. Square & Forbidden City)

Itinerary (Con't) page 3

- 0700 Buffet breakfast in hotel restaurant with select delegation members
Attire: Civilian coat & tie/Class "A"
- 0745 Depart hotel for State Guest House, Diaoyutai
- 0830 Arrive State Guest House for meeting with Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council
- 0930 Depart State Guest House
- 1000 Arrive Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Bureau for courtesy call with General Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of the General Staff Department
(Note: gift exchange)
- 1030 Depart MND FAB
- 1040 Arrive COSTIND for meeting with LTG Shen Rongjun, Vice Minister, COSTIND
- 1115 Depart COSTIND
- 1130 Arrive hotel
- 1200 No-host casual lunch; location TBD
- 1330 Depart lunch
- 1400 Arrive Ministry of Foreign Affairs for meeting with Li Zhaoxing, Vice Foreign Minister, MFA
- 1515 Depart for Great Hall of the People
- 1600 Arrive Great Hall of the People; meet with Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defence General Chi Haotian
(Note: gift exchange)
- 1700 Depart for hotel.
- 1730 Arrive hotel; personal time

Itinerary (Con't) page 4

- 1800 Depart hotel for DATT's residence.
- 1815 Arrive DATT residence for USD(P) hosted buffet dinner in honor of Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai
(Note: toast)
- 2030 Depart for hotel
- 2100 Arrive hotel; RON

FRIDAY, 28 JUNE

- 0600 Baggage pick-up. Breakfast optional in hotel dining room
- 0630 Depart hotel for Beijing Airport.
- 0700 Arrive Beijing Airport, Old Terminal; met by Gen Zhan Maohai
- 0730 Depart via Milair (flt. 3+40)
- 1210 Arrive Yokota AFB Japan
(Note: Set clocks ahead one hour)

**USD(P) Visit to China
June 25-28, 1996**

Delegation List

¶* Mr. Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian & Pacific Affairs

* Dr. Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asia-Pacific Affairs

Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy

* Major General Martin Steele, USMC, Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, USCINCPAC/J5

¶* Mr. Robert Suettinger, Director, Asian Affairs, NSC

* Brigadier General Robert H. Foglesong, USAF, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff/J5

¶* Colonel K.C. Brown, USA, Military Assistant to USD(P)

¶* Colonel Karl Eikenberry, USA, OSD/International Security Affairs, Country Director for China

* Captain Linda M. Lentz, Deputy Chairman, Strategy Department, National Defense University

¶* Ms. Susan C. Lester, Confidential Assistant To USD(P)

¶* Ssgt Dwight M. Brown, USA, Communications Assistant

¶* Msgt Edwin R. Perry, USAF, Communications Officer

¶ On Military Air Flight into China

* Travel to Japan after China portion

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Walter B. Slocombe was nominated by President Clinton to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on July 13, 1994 and confirmed by the Senate on September 14, 1994. Prior to this appointment, he had served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since June 1, 1993. Pending his confirmation, he had been a consultant to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from January 21, 1993.

He had previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (USDP), from November 1979 to January 1981, and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA) from January 1977 to November 1979. In both positions, he served concurrently as Director of the DoD SALT Task Force.

From January 1981 until he joined the Clinton administration, he had been a member of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, since February 1981. He had earlier practiced law at Caplin & Drysdale since 1971, where he became a partner in 1974.

In 1970-71 he was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. In 1969 and 1970 he was a member of the Program Analysis Office of the National Security Council staff, working on strategic arms control, long term security policy planning, and Intelligence Issues.

He is author of The Political Implications of Strategic Parity (ISS Adelphi Paper No. 77, 1971), "The Countervailing Strategy," (International Security, Spring 1981), "Extended Deterrence" (Washington Quarterly, Fall 1984), "Strategic Stability in a Restructured World," (Survival, July/August 1990), and other papers and articles on defense policy and on tax law. During the period 1986-1993, he served as a consultant to RAND and the Strategic Air Command Technical Advisory committee, as a member of the Advisory panel for the Office of Technology Assessment studies of strategic command and control and as Chairman of its study of the defense industrial base. He was a member of advisory councils of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, the National Security Archive, the Center for Naval Analyses Strategy and Forces Division, MIT's Lincoln National Laboratory, and the Center for National Security Studies at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and on the Board of Directors of the United States Committee for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Born in 1941, he grew up in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He graduated in 1963 from Princeton University, where he was in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. In 1963-65 he studied Soviet politics as a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford. He received his law degree summa cum laude in 1968 from Harvard Law School, where he was Note Editor of the Law Review. He clerked for Justice Abe Fortas during the October 1968 Term of the United States Supreme Court.

His wife is Ellen Seidman, a Special Assistant to the President and member of the National Economic Council Staff, and former Senior Vice President at FNMA. He has two grown daughters and a twelve year old son.

KENT M. WIEDEMANN

Prior to entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Wiedemann served two years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Micronesia (Truk), and for three years directed management development and training with various international operations of Hewlett Packard Company. During his diplomatic career to date, Mr. Wiedemann has served as a consul in Poland, international relations officer in Latin American Affairs at the State Department, and was posted twice to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, China and once to the U.S. consulate general in Shanghai. He has also been director of the Office of Chinese Affairs at the State Department, as well as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassies in both Singapore and Israel. From 1993-94 Mr. Wiedemann was appointed Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. Mr. Wiedemann was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1994-95. He was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific in May, 1995, and is responsible for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Burma.

Mr. Wiedemann was a Diplomat-in-Residence and Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, is a recipient of the State Department's Meritorious Honor Award and Superior Honor Award, and has also been awarded the Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service by the Secretary of Defense.

A native of California, Mr. Wiedemann has a B.A. in History from San Jose State University, and an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Oregon. He is married to the former Janice Lee Weddle, an educator. Together, they have a son, Conrad and currently reside in Great Falls, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.

KURT M. CAMPBELL

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell was appointed as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific on May 15, 1995. He was formerly the Counselor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) and the Head of the Plans and Analysis Group. Before coming to the Pentagon he served as Director in the Democracy office of the National Security Council. Previously he was the Deputy Special Counselor to the President for NAFTA in the White House. He has also been the Chief of Staff (International) to Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, and the White House Fellow (class of 1992) at the Department of the Treasury. Campbell was part of the Treasury delegation at the Vancouver US-Russian Summit, the 1993 G-7 Summit in Tokyo, the Presidential visit to South Korea, and the Foreign/Finance Ministerial meeting in Tokyo.

Dr. Campbell was Associate Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has also been the Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs and a Director of the South Africa Project at Harvard University. He was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations at the Pentagon, a stringer for the New York Times Magazine in Southern Africa, an Olin Fellow at the Russian Research Center, a Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, a lecturer in International Relations at Brown University, a consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation, a Distinguished Marshall Scholar in Great Britain, and a member of St. Cross College at Oxford University.

Campbell received his B.A. in political science from the University of California, a Certificate in music (violin) and political philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, and his Doctorate in International Relations from Brasenose College at Oxford University. He rowed and played rugby for the first Brasenose College teams and received his Varsity "Blue" in tennis for representing Oxford in the Cambridge match.

Campbell was formerly a Special Assistant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a member of the US-Soviet Dangerous Military Activities negotiating team. He also coordinated the J-5 external advisory group on emerging avenues of military diplomacy. He received a Joint Service Commendation Medal for his work on the Joint Staff. Campbell has also served as a reserve naval officer in a special CNO intelligence advisory unit in the Pentagon.

He is the author of two books, numerous scholarly articles, and many newspaper, magazine, and opinion pieces on a wide range of international subjects. He maintains a farm in Little Washington, Rappahanock County, Virginia.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein

Mitchel B. Wallerstein has served since 1993 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy. Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Dr. Wallerstein was for three years the Deputy Executive Officer of the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences, where he managed a staff of 1,400 people. The NRC is a private, non-profit organization which provides policy advice to the Congress and Executive Branch. While at the NRC, he also directed a series of highly acclaimed policy studies for the U. S. Government on national security export controls. Earlier in his career, Dr. Wallerstein directed the international affairs division of the National Research Council and, prior to that, served for five years on the faculty at M.I.T. Dr. Wallerstein currently teaches as an adjunct faculty member at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies. He holds a Ph.D and M.S. in Political Science from M.I.T., a Masters degree in Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and an A.B. from Dartmouth College. Dr. Wallerstein is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

ROBERT LEE SUETTINGER

Robert Lee Suettinger was appointed as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council in March 1994.

Previously, Mr. Suettinger served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council. From April 1989 through February 1994, he was responsible for a variety of intelligence community analyses on Asian-related issues.

A career intelligence officer, Mr. Suettinger served in several analytical and managerial positions within CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. From April 1987 until April 1989, he was Director of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

A native of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, Mr. Suettinger received his B.A. degree, *magna cum laude*, from Lawrence University in 1968, with a major in Government. After two years of military service, one of which was in Vietnam as a combat engineer, he entered Columbia University's School of International Affairs. Mr. Suettinger received a Masters Degree in Comparative Politics from Columbia University in January 1975.

Mr. Suettinger is married to Sue-Jean Lee, and they reside in North Potomac, MD with their three children.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, DIVISION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1775 (703) 614-4309



MAJOR GENERAL MARTIN R. STEELE, USMC

Major General Martin R. Steele is the Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, J-5, USCINCPAC, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

He was born in Philadelphia, Pa., and grew up in Fayetteville, Arkansas. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in January 1965. His initial tour of duty was with the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Calif., during which he deployed to the Republic of Vietnam. Subsequently assigned as a corporal to Officer Candidates School, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in January 1967.

A tour of duty as a platoon commander, executive officer, and tank company commander in the 2d Tank Battalion was followed by duty aboard the USS ST. PAUL (CA-73) in Southeast Asia and an assignment as Officer-in-Charge of Sea School in Portsmouth, Va. In 1973, he returned to Camp Pendleton and served as a tank company commander, battalion S-3, and Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division.

An overseas assignment as an assault amphibian vehicle company commander and battalion S-3, was followed by duty as the Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the project Manager M-60/M-1 Tank programs at the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive command in Warren, Michigan. He also served at Headquarters Marine Corps as the Tank Acquisition Project Officer.



In August 1985, General Steele returned to the 1st Marine Division, where he served initially as the Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Vehicle Battalion until June 1986, and then as the Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion until June 1988. The following month, he transferred overseas where he was assigned as Operations Officer, C/J/G-3, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea. Upon his return from overseas in August 1990, he assumed the duties as the Deputy Director, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Airfighting Center, MCCDC Quantico.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, General Steele served as G-3, MARCENT (FWD) aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE. In July 1992, he was assigned duty as the Director, Warfighting Development Integration Division at Quantico. While serving in this capacity, he was selected in March 1993 for promotion to brigadier general. He was promoted to that grade on May 20, 1993, and was assigned duty as Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Quantico on June 15, 1993. While serving in this capacity, he was selected in November 1994 for promotion to major general. He assumed his current assignment on April 17, 1995.

General Steele holds a B.A. degree from the University of Arkansas (1974); M.A. degrees from Central Michigan University (1981), Salve Regina College (1985), and the Naval War College. He is a distinguished graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course; an honor graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College; and a graduate of the Naval War College.

His personal decorations include: the Defense Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Meritorious Service Medal; Navy Commendation Medal with gold star; and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Major General Steele is married to the former Cynthia Bayliss of Little Rock, Arkansas. They have three children: Diane, David, and Deborah.

(Revised Aug. 15, 1995 HQMC)



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20330-1690

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. FOGLESONG

Brigadier General Robert H. Foglesong is deputy director for politico-military affairs for Asia/Pacific, Middle East/Africa and global issues, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. He is responsible for regional planning and policy matters concerning concepts and studies on specific countries or regional groups and represents the Joint Staff in coordination with other U.S. government agencies. His personnel also participate in interregional planning and provide planning guidance and concept review of combatant commands' operational plans.



The general earned his wings at Columbus Air Force Base, Miss. His aviation career includes more than 3,400 flying hours primarily in fighter and training assignments in F-15, F-16, AT-38, T-38 and AT-33 aircraft. He has been a commander four times -- twice as a wing commander. His staff tours include duty as special assistant to the deputy chief of staff for research, development and acquisition on the Air Staff; special assistant to the commander of Tactical Air Command; chief of staff of the Air Force chair; professor of joint and combined warfare, National War College; and director of the chief of staff of the Air Force's Operations Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

General Foglesong and his wife, Mary, are both from West Virginia. They have two sons, David and Mark.

EDUCATION:

- 960 Bachelor of science degree in chemical engineering, West Virginia University
- 969 Master of science degree in chemical engineering, West Virginia University
- 971 Doctorate of philosophy in chemical engineering, West Virginia University
- 989 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. April 1972 - March 1973, student, undergraduate pilot training program, Columbus Air Force Base, Miss.
2. August 1973 - June 1976, T-41 instructor pilot, 557th Flying Training Squadron, Peterson Field, Colo., and U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
3. July 1976 - April 1977, aide-de-camp to the commander, Air Forces Korea, 314th Air Division, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea
4. May 1977 - January 1979, AT-33 and EB/B-57 instructor pilot, flight examiner and assistant operations officer, 17th Defense Systems Evaluation Squadron, and special assistant to the 24th NORAD Region commander, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.
5. February 1979 - January 1980, AT-33 instructor pilot and commander, Detachment 1, 24th Air Defense Squadron, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.

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COLONEL KEIRN C. BROWN, JR., USA

Colonel K. C. Brown is the Senior Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He comes to this position from a year's Fellowship at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. Immediately preceding his CFIA Fellowship, Colonel Brown served a two-year assignment as SACEUR's Representative in the United States and SHAPE Liaison Officer in Washington, D.C. As such he was responsible for policy coordination between the SACEUR and the U.S. national security and foreign affairs community including the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Congress.

Born 19 January 1947 in Port Jefferson, New York, Colonel Brown was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1969. He holds a Masters in German Studies from Middlebury College, and spent two years of graduate study at Mainz University in Germany. His military education includes completion of the College of Naval Command and Staff, and the Army War College.

Colonel Brown has held a wide variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Europe and Southeast Asia. He has served in airborne, airmobile, mechanized and light Infantry units and in both joint and combined assignments. He commanded a rifle company of the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, and held subsequent command of Infantry units at the company and battalion level in the Army's Berlin Brigade. The latter tour coincided with the period of the Nicholson slaying and the La Belle disco bombing. In addition he has served as a Ranger instructor at the Infantry School and as an Assistant Professor of Foreign Languages at West Point. As a staff officer in the 3rd Infantry Division and VII (U.S.) Corps in Germany and with Allied Command Europe, he has held responsible positions in battalion through theater level organizations.

Prior to assuming his posting SHAPE, Colonel Brown served on the Army Staff in Washington as speech writer for the Vice Chief of Staff and later as Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, responsible for long range planning and political military affairs.

While a student at the Army War College he was a member of the Current Affairs Panel, visiting 22 college and university campuses from Maine to California. In 1989, he was selected a Seminar XXI Fellow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Council of the United States. His research interests at the Center for International Affairs involved the evolution of NATO's new Alliance Strategic Concept into new roles and missions embracing peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance.

Colonel Brown is a qualified Ranger and parachutist. Among his awards and decorations are the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, the Soldiers' Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. He enjoys outdoor interests, sports, history, classical music, and travel. His languages are German, French and Indonesian. He and his wife, Joan, are the parents of two daughters and a son, and raise Labrador retrievers.

COLONEL KARL W. EIKENBERRY

Senior Country Director for China and Mongolia

Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry is a United States Army infantry officer who has been assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, since November 1994.

He commanded a light infantry battalion in the 10th Mountain Division, and held command and staff positions in mechanized, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the United States, Korea, and Europe. He also served as a division chief in the Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate of the Army Staff, and was an assistant army attaché to the People's Republic of China.

Colonel Eikenberry is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, holds a master's degree in East Asian studies from Harvard University, an advanced study degree in history from the University of Nanjing in China, and is completing his Ph.D. graduate studies with the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He was awarded the British Civil Service Interpreter's Certificate upon graduating from the British Ministry of Defence Chinese Language School in Hong Kong. He was also a national security fellow at the JFK School of Government at Harvard University.

Colonel Eikenberry is married to the former Ching-yuan Hou.

**CAPTAIN LINDA M. LENTZ
UNITED STATES NAVY**

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

July 1993 - Present
Deputy Chairman for the Department of Strategy, Industrial
College of the Armed Forces
Director, China Regional Security Studies
Professor of National Strategy Studies

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

August 1992 - June 1993
Student, College of Naval Warfare
Master of Arts, National Security Strategy Studies

NAVY RECRUITING DISTRICT

June 1990 - June 1992
Commanding Officer for the largest Navy Recruiting District in
the Continental United States encompassing area in the six states
of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming and Nevada.

JOINT STAFF

January 1987 - May 1990
International Plans Officer leading world-wide, on-site resource
analyses for the organizations reporting to and through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NAVY RECRUITING DISTRICT Columbia, South Carolina
Executive Officer December 1984 - December 1986

CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING Pensacola, Florida
Programs Manager October 1982 - November 1984

COMMANDER, NAVAL BASE Newport, Rhode Island
Aide & Executive Assistant November 1984 - October 1982

Commissioned an Ensign in 1972, Captain Lentz served in various
other staff and headquarters assignments.

AWARDS

Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy Commendation Medal (Three Awards)
Meritorious Unit Commendation
National Defense Service Medal (Two Awards)
Navy Recruiting Ribbon (Three Awards)
Joint Chiefs of Staff Service Badge
Navy Recruiting Badge w/ 12 Gold Wreaths

IMPORTANT NUMBERS

Room Assignments:

Mr. Walter B. Slocombe _____
Mr. Kent Wiedemann _____
Dr. Kurt M. Campbell _____
Major General Martin Steele _____
Mr. Robert Suettinger _____
Brigadier General Robert H. Foglesong _____
Colonel K.C. Brown _____
Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry _____
Captain Linda M. Lentz _____
Ms Susan C. Lester _____
MSGT Edwin R. Perry _____
SSG Dwight M. Brown _____
Control Room _____
Flight Crew _____

Telephone Numbers:

American Embassy Switchboard: 011-8610-65323831
Marine Guard Post, American Embassy (24-hours/day): 65321910
Defense Attaché, BG Michael Byrnes: O- 65323831, ext. 600; H- 65322779
Naval Attaché & Control Officer, Captain Jack Reddinger: O- 65323831,
ext. 602; H: 653242570
USDAO Beijing OPSCO, CW3 Richard Dermott: O- 65323831, ext. 613;
H: 65323793
USDAO Beijing Fax: 65322160
USDAO Beijing STUIII: 65325242
Beijing Kempinski Hotel: 4653388
Chinese Ministry of National Defence Foreign Affairs Bureau: 2018305
USDAO Tokyo: 011-03-32245831

Arrival at Beijing Airport

TIME: 25 June; 1940

PLACE: Old terminal,
Beijing Airport

SCENARIO:

You will be met, as you come off the airplane at Beijing Airport by Brigadier General Mike Byrnes, the DATT, along with PLA Lieutenant General Zhan ("JOHN") Maohai with several staff officers. Expect a short exchange of pleasantries until baggage has been loaded and customs cleared. You will travel to your hotel via the DATT's sedan.

OUR ISSUES:

You can express thanks to General Zhan for coming to the air base to meet you, and for the excellent arrangements that have been made for you by the PLA. You can inform General Zhan that you are pleased to be in China and are looking forward the next three days in Beijing and meeting Minister of Defense Chi Haotian.

PRC ISSUES:

General Zhan will welcome you and inform you that the PLA leadership is looking forward to dialogue with you. He will note that your visit comes at an important juncture in the relationship between the militaries of the U.S. and China, and that the PLA attaches special significance to your trip as an opportunity to reinvigorate the relationship.

LTG Zhan and BG Byrnes bios follows

13 October 1994

Brigadier General Michael T. Byrnes

Brigadier General Michael T. Byrnes, United States Army, A native of Bristol, Rhode Island, was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant from the ROTC Program at Providence College in June of 1967.

In over 26 years of service, General Byrnes has served in various stateside assignments and postings to Germany, Vietnam, Hong Kong and China. He is a graduate of the University of New Hampshire where he received a Master of Arts degree in International Relations with concentration in East Asian Studies.

From 1982 to 1984 he studied Mandarin Chinese at the British Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School in Hong Kong. In March of 1985 General Byrnes assumed command of the 2nd Battalion (Basic Training), of the U.S. Army Training Center at Fort Bliss, Texas. Following this two year command he returned to Hong Kong to serve as the Army Liaison Officer (Military Attache). In 1989-1990 General Byrnes attended the U.S. Naval War College, graduating with distinction and subsequently holding the position of U.S. Army fellow at the Naval War College for 1990-1991.

General Byrnes is currently the Defense Attache to Beijing China. General Byrnes was promoted to his current rank on 28 June 1994. He is married to Marie Elana Fasano and they have three children, Christopher, Meredith and Patrick.

Country Team Briefing

TIME: 26 June; 0830-0930

PLACE: US Embassy

PARTICIPANTS:


USD(P) and full delegation will be briefed by Amb Jim Sasser, US Defense Attache BG Byrnes, his assistants and other members of the Country Team.

ISSUES:

After Ambassador Sasser and Country Team remarks you should ask them for their assessment of:

- The state of Sino-American relations as we emerge further from the tensions created by the March exercises
- Senior Chinese leaders' views on security and military dialogues with the United States
- PRC/PLA strategies towards Taiwan; likelihood of a resumption of Cross-strait dialogue.
- The possibility for a PRC MOD visit to the United States
- Recommendations on objectives and approaches to adopt over the next few days

Finally, thank the Country Team for its great support. They are well respected in DoD for their excellent reporting, analysis, and first class treatment of US military delegations which visit China.



AMB Sasser bio, Sasser cable on FON, and FON background material follow.

JAMES R. SASSER

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 230
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 639-0512

1995: Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Attorney, Washington and Tennessee

1977-1995 United States Senator

- Chairman, Senate Budget Committee
- Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Committee on Appropriations
- Chairman, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Senate Banking Committee
- Chairman, Subcommittee on General Services, Federalism and the District of Columbia, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
- Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislative Branch, Committee on Appropriations

1961-1977 Attorney, Goodpasture, Carpenter, Woods & Sasser
Nashville, Tennessee

1973-1976 Chairman, Democratic Party of Tennessee

EDUCATION: B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1958
J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1961


HONORS/AWARDS: Honorary Degree, Tusculum College, Greeneville, Tennessee
Honorary Degree, Lane College, Jackson, Tennessee
Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

ORGANIZATIONS/AFFILIATIONS: Regent, Smithsonian Institution, 1987-1995
Trustee, Sgt. Alvin C. York Historical Association, 1993-Present

Wife: Mary G. Sasser

Children: James Gray Sasser
Elizabeth B. Sasser

(b2)



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~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 020891
STATE FOR EAP A/S LORD; SECDEF FOR DR. CAMPBELL AND
COL EIKENBERRY (ISA-AP); NSC FOR BURGER; CINCPAC FOR
ADMIRAL PRUEHER FROM AMBASSADOR SASSER
E. O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: MARR, PREL, CH
SUBJECT: FON EXERCISE JUNE 12 (U)
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JAMES R. SASSER, AMBASSADOR.
REASON: 1.5(A)X6.



China FON

180310Z MAY 96 USCINCPAC proposal
AMEMB Beijing and USDAO were info addrees

240500Z MAY USCINCPAC adjusts track; AMEMB and USDAO were info
addrees; ensures that track will stay seaward of new PRC baseline

29 MAY Advance copy of Joint Staff action package on FON forwarded to
State and NSC

310946Z MAY USDAO Beijing message to CINCPAC; info State and Defense;
"Country team" voices concern with FON, citing timing

31 MAY Director, Joint Staff approves FON

3 JUN USDP approves FON

4 JUN FON package forwarded to State and NSC for review

6 JUN State approves FON

110410Z JUN USCINCPAC message to USDAO Beijing, info AMEMB; CINC
desires to continue with FON

11 JUN NSC approves FON

12 JUN FON conducted; no reaction noted

~~SECRET~~

- I look forward to continuing our discussions at dinner this evening. Again, thank you for your excellent hosting of my visit to Beijing.

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

SAIC

Send comments/questions to the CHAIRS developers or call 693-5354.
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STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

JOINT U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMISSION

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China, recognizing that the peaceful use of military industrial technology is in the economic and national security interests of their peoples, declare their intention to promote cooperation in their defense conversion efforts. To this end, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have established a Joint U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission to promote the orderly use, for peaceful purposes, of defense industrial, technological and scientific facilities and personnel not needed for defense requirements to satisfy the requirements of civil society.

The Joint Defense Conversion Commission will provide a senior channel of communication between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to promote mutual understanding of, and cooperation on, issues relating to the defense industry, including:

- facilitating contacts between the industries of the two countries and promoting appropriate industrial partnerships, technological relationships, and investment by American firms in China, and by Chinese firms in the U.S.
- sharing experiences and lessons from defense industry conversion in the two countries;
- rationalizing defense science, technology and industry conversion planning and management appropriate for peacetime;
- addressing issues of personnel, equipment, and production of defense industry related to the defense conversion cooperation between the two countries.

The Joint Commission will also explore new areas of and approaches to the cooperation.

STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES OF THE JOINT DEFENSE CONVERSION
COMMISSION OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The People's Republic of China and the United States of America, desiring to promote the cooperation between the two countries in defense conversion, have decided to establish the Joint Defense Conversion Commission of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Commission") and to adopt the following:

SECTION ONE: PURPOSE

The Joint Commission has the following purposes: to facilitate economic cooperation and technological exchanges and cooperation between the two countries regarding defense conversion, to maintain regular contacts through government channels, and to address issues that occur in the course of cooperation and explore new areas of and approaches to cooperation.

SECTION TWO: ORGANIZATION

The Joint Commission is composed of Chinese and American sides. Each side has a chairman, members, and an executive secretary on the Commission.

The chairman of each side will inform the other side of the Commission members of each side and of any change in members.

The Joint Commission may set up, as needed, ad hoc special working groups which may function in accordance with this document.

SECTION THREE: OPERATING PROCEDURES

The meetings of the Joint Commission will convene as deemed necessary by both chairmen, the site to rotate between the two countries. The commission meetings are presided over by the co-chairmen. In the absence of the co-chairmen, the meetings will be presided over by Commission members designated by them. One or two months prior to the meeting, both sides will discuss and agree on the date of the meetings and exchange a preliminary proposed agenda for the meeting. The executive secretaries and the working groups of the two sides will make preparations for the meetings and agree in principle on the meeting and agree in principle on the meeting minutes one month before the meeting.

The Joint Commission will review at its meeting the items on the agenda and relevant issues for discussion as agreed between the co-chairmen. The decisions

agreed upon by both sides in the meeting will be written into the meeting minutes and will go into effect after the meeting minutes are signed by the co-chairmen.

If one side of the Joint Commission needs to obtain the approval of the relevant government department of its country for a decision recorded in the meeting minutes, the decision in question will become effective after the chairman of the side informs the other side of its approval.

The minutes of the Joint Commission will be written in Chinese and English, both versions being equally authentic. The appendix of the meeting minutes constitute an integral part of the meeting minutes.

SECTION FOUR: THE DUTIES OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The executive secretary of each side will be a member of the Joint Commission, be responsible for daily work, coordinate the activities of the special working groups, prepare the documents for the meetings of the Joint Commission, and fulfill other duties in connection with the activities of the Joint Commission.

The executive secretaries of each side will maintain contact with each other.

SECTION FIVE: EXPENDITURES

Except as otherwise agreed, each side will be responsible for all costs that its members incur.

SECTION SIX: AMENDMENTS

With the agreement of both sides, the Joint Commission may revise and amend this document.

SECTION SEVEN: EFFECTIVE DATE

Dating from October 17, 1994, the Joint Commission shall be in operation for five years. Unless one side informs the other of its desire to terminate the Commission at least six months prior to its expiration, then the Commission shall be extended for 5 additional years. The Commission may be terminated by either side upon six months written notice.

Eight Step Process
U.S.-China Air Traffic Control Cooperation
Under the
Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission

STEP 1

(Completed). Re-established U.S.-China military-to-military contact with the October 1994 visit to China by U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry. The U.S. and China agreed that air traffic control should be a topic under the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission.

STEP 2

(Completed). Visit by U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator David Hinson to China in November, 1994. Discussions with both General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) and military officials on air traffic control issues and future cooperation.

STEP 3

(Completed). "Statement of Intent for Implementation of GPS between the FAA and CAAC" signed December 13, 1994 in Washington, D.C. The FAA and CAAC agreed to continue consultation in this area with the objective of defining a strategy and work plan for implementation of GPS in China.

STEP 4

(Completed). In February 1995, a U.S. team of military and civil aviation officials visited China to brief senior PLAAF and CAAC officials on the U.S. system of civil/military cooperation in air traffic control. The U.S. delegation was led by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Operations (AF/XO), LtGen Ralston.

STEP 5

(Completed). In March, 1995, a Chinese team of military and civil aviation officials traveled to the United States to visit FAA and Department of Defense (DoD) facilities. They also met with U.S. industry participating in a "Special China Program" for air traffic control and airport officials in Los Angeles, California.

STEP 6

(Completed). January 21-27, 1996. U.S. civil/military delegation traveled to China to visit civil and military air traffic control and air defense facilities. This was a reciprocal event to Step 5. Chinese did not offer to visit military facilities. The U.S. delegation was led by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Operations (AF/XO), LtGen Eberhart.

STEP 7

(Postponed; date TBD). (Originally scheduled for April 17-26, 1996). DoD, FAA, and U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) would have hosted a Chinese civil and military delegation at the April, 1996 Asia Pacific Aviation Symposium. The Chinese visit would have included a visit to the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, CA; Nellis AFB, NV; and NAS Miramar, CA.

STEP 8

(Postponed; date TBD). Second Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission meeting in Washington, D.C. U.S. and Chinese officials report on progress that has been made and identify future plans for cooperation.

Updated 30 April, 1996


Su Ge, Dean and Professor
Foreign Affairs College
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
May 31, 1996

I worry that the two sides keep sending each other the wrong signals. The basis for a normal relationship will be weakened. Although it is said in theory that China wants to proceed with improvement of relations, if the Taiwan issue comes to the fore, any U.S. move will be seen as not in accord with America's stated intentions. The U.S. established diplomatic ties with Vietnam, improved relations with India, and revised its defense pact with Japan, all of which are interpreted by some people as encirclement and containment of China despite U.S. efforts to reassure Beijing through diplomatic channels. The more the U.S. says that it is not trying to contain and encircle China, the more suspicious China becomes. You can see this in China's position on Cuba in the UN, Beijing's improvement in relations with Russia and Qian Qichen's visits to Iran and Libya. The U.S. will interpret this as China not being cooperative and being difficult to integrate into the international system. The consequence is that the other side is left with fewer choices and there tends to be a hardening of positions and the two sides pursuing policies not in each other's interests.

The Taiwan issue is going to be the most explosive. We must strengthen the common ground in general in Sino-American relations and realize that the common ground is not inexhaustible. We need to capitalize on the opportunities and not let them slip away. Taiwan is the only issue that can derail Sino-American relations. Strategically, we do not see each other as enemies. On Taiwan we need to keep the status quo.

We are looking at the long term—at relations in the 21st century. The elements for confrontational relations are increasing in both countries. I want to see that we don't send each the wrong signals, but the developments of the last few months have set off alarms about relations.

Q. Do you see a readjustment in Chinese foreign policy and is it intended to create a strategic alternative for China or merely to exert tactical pressure on the United States?

Sometimes the line is blurred between tactical and strategic. We need to prevent tactical maneuvers from becoming strategic. One reason for sending Chinese officials to Africa is to get votes for China in the UNHRC as well as to compete with Taiwan. It is not aimed directly against the United States. But gradually it could become strategic. One reason why China dragged out the process in the UN over Cuba [in response to the shooting down of Cuban exile planes] was to enhance China's leverage.

Q. Some people in the United States say this adjustment is in preparation for a serious deterioration or even a break in relations with the U.S.

It is my impression that this adjustment is a preparation for a worst case scenario. They hope for a better outcome but have to be prepared. The carriers were not conducive to improving Sino-American relations. I don't think the carriers will have a lasting impact because of positive U.S. actions afterwards. When relations are good, expect bad things to happen, and when relations are bad, expect good things. Both sides decided not to let the ring magnets become a contentious issue.

Q. What has been the impact of the carrier deployment on the Chinese public?

Because of the way the U.S. decision was made at this historical juncture and the way it was reported by Central TV and the rest of the Chinese media, it had a very negative impact on public opinion. For the leadership and those people who know the situation, however, there was an understanding of the limits of the U.S. action, how it related to U.S. domestic politics and to the democratic process in Taiwan, and that it was not just brinkmanship. The negative impact on the mentality on this side is about U.S. intentions and whether the U.S. wants good relations with China. In contrast with the view of Chinese experts, many people say the carrier deployment is evidence that the U.S. wants to fragment and dismember China. The general reaction is thus very negative. People in the street who are interviewed say it is power politics and gunboat diplomacy.

I still have hope for good relations.

Q. What was the view of the carrier deployment in the MFA?

People knew there was not going to be war, although there were rumors that things could get out of control. An aircraft carrier cannot intimidate the PLA.

Q. Did the MFA people see the carrier deployment as especially significant?

They regarded it as very hostile. It moved the pendulum to one side in official discourse.

You can divide scholars into two groups--those who see U.S. strategy as containment and those who maintain that it is engagement with elements of containment or soft containment. I try to use the word "check" (qianzhi) rather than containment. The meaning of "check" is like checks and balances. It is like a chess game. Each side tries to make moves to enhance their leverage over the other in a strategic game. During the period that the aircraft carriers were sent, what message did the U.S. send to Taiwan?

At first, U.S. policy was strategic ambiguity, but now it is moving toward more clarity. This is dangerous. There is growing sentiment in the PLA and the government that China can and should stand up to the challenge--even defeat the U.S. carriers. If the U.S. thinks it can win a war and Taiwan thinks that it can deter an attack from China as in 1958 and then China says that it can seize Taiwan, all this is dangerous. War is not likely now, but if things go on like this, determination will harden to prepare to meet any challenge. We don't know what the top-level discussions are--no one does. Instead of saying that we don't seek confrontation, China may say that we are not afraid of confrontation. This is my sense.

The foreign policymaking process is interesting. Sometimes decisions can be made in a telephone call with Jiang Zemin or over the dinner table.

I am afraid U.S. policy could go through another cycle like the 1940s in which the U.S. thought it supported both Taiwan and the Mainland while neither side thought the U.S. has done enough. The Mainland will think what the U.S. has done for China is negative because of Taiwan. Taiwan will think the U.S. has not done enough--has not provided enough arms or arms that are good enough, or that it has not given Taiwan enough political support. Both sides will think that the U.S. has tried to keep Taiwan and the Mainland separated for its own interests. The U.S. will get blamed by both sides. If the two sides are reunified, China will be hostile to the United States. When scholars from Taiwan look at the 1940s, 50s and 60s, their portrayal of the United States is negative. A scholar from Taiwan wrote a book critical of the United States for not giving Taiwan

enough and for being too ambivalent. Even the Mutual Defense Treaty was viewed as having bound Taiwan's hands and feet so that it had to rely on the United States--and then the U.S. abandoned Taiwan.

The Chinese side thinks the U.S. established diplomatic ties with China but never forgot about Taiwan. So the carriers had a negative impact. Since 1979 and Ye Jianying's 9 points, which was a turning point in Chinese policy, China has been sincere about reunification. China's conditions for reunification became more and more flexible as long as Taiwan accepted a one China policy.

I am doing a study of the evolution of China's attitude toward Lee Teng-hui. Lee Teng-hui was hand-picked by Chiang Ching-Kuo. Chiang had placed great hopes on Lee. The Chinese side was optimistic about Lee at the time. The Chinese side concluded from Lee's famous interview with the Japanese journalist, however, that Lee was really seeking independence.

On Sino-American relations, the negative images of each other could lead to a major strategic decision by China. I told Liu Huaqiu over lunch recently that if we really want to keep balanced and normal relations with the United States, we should try not to let certain things escalate and thus threaten China's national interests. You have to put it in national interest terms to someone in Liu's position.

For people who do not want further deterioration of Sino-American relations, we need to send a warning to top leaders that they need to ponder the negative impact of small decisions by either side that could affect larger strategic interests. The U.S. needs to make its deeds match its words.

If the situation changes, leaders' secretaries can put on their desks different papers already written that are more hardline. There are people who are pushing to get these hard-line papers presented to the top.

CICIR has some younger people who are taking a harder line like Xi Laiwang and Chu Shulong. I talked with a graduate of CICIR's Institute of International Relations who said that he was told that when preparing policy papers you should keep in mind the general policy line and not just give your own view.

The more you study it, the more you see that U.S. foreign policy lacks consensus. When you look at what the U.S. has done in the last few years, you can see that many steps are contradictory.

Both U.S. and Chinese policies on IPR are increasingly directed at domestic audiences.

Q. What domestic audiences in China?

At this juncture, for policy makers who want to play tough following the sending of the carriers, they have a forum to work out a policy of tit for tat. Just two hours after the U.S. announced sanctions on IPR, the MOFTEC came out with its list of Chinese sanctions at 2 am. They wanted to give a sense they were tough. The MFA and MOFTEC still hope to reach a last minute agreement, but there are some people prepared to accept a trade war with the United States. If the U.S. imposes sanctions, MOFTEC will impose sanctions as well. What is dangerous is that the possible deterioration of Sino-American relations is not important to these people--they just want to show their bosses that they are tough.

Q. Where does the PLA fit in to this?

I don't know too much about the PLA but I think that Americans tend to exaggerate the role of the PLA in foreign policy decision making. The PLA does not have much say in foreign affairs. The Party controls the military. Yang Baibing got thrown out for departing from the line despite being the brother of Yang Shangkun.

I passed on a letter to the Reunification Council from Ralph Clough that said Lee Teng-hui was not seeking independence. They were most interested in his viewpoint, but probably don't accept it.

Chinese officials say that the military exercises have succeeded in checking the independence tendency in Taiwan. Now there is more clarity in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangular relationship. The U.S. sees that China will use force and the United States deployments pushed China a step forward--they showed that the U.S. is a force to be reckoned with. Some people thought there was a 60% chance that the U.S. would not intervene during the military exercises.

Q. I think it is a good thing that the U.S. sent the carriers so that China will not miscalculate.

I think it is dangerous. In the 1950s, it would not have been dangerous because China really planned to liberate Taiwan. It is dangerous now because as a result, China is no longer planning only for peaceful reunification but also for the possibility of conflict with the United States. China sees the U.S. carriers as giving Taiwan the sense that the U.S. will support Taiwan if it goes independent.

Was there ever a serious possibility of military conflict? Did the U.S. tell Liu Huaqiu that it was sending the carriers before it was publicly announced? What worries me is that Perry was viewed as a promoter of Sino-American relations, but not anymore.

Chinese foreign policy is still inward looking and designed to maintain domestic stability.

The U.S. gives the impression to those people trying to improve China's relations with Taiwan that it is trying to disrupt this process and keep Taiwan and the Mainland divided. Then other issues make the situation worse.

Neither the United States or Japan wants to say that the revised U.S.-Japan alliance is anti-China, but behind the curtain it is. What is more important is not the number of U.S. troops in Japan, but how they are regarded. The five-country CBM agreement between China and Russia, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan has wording about no one seeking hegemony. This is not directed against the U.S. but it can be a factor to offset some U.S. advantage. This all sends the wrong signals and sets off a chain reaction. Now Sino-American relations are drifting toward greater confrontation. We don't want to scratch lines in our minds. There are such scratches already--we don't want to deepen the cuts. If the situation worsens, those people with an interest in promoting good relations could lose their enthusiasm. That would be very damaging.

The U.S. needs to keep a low profile on the Taiwan issue.

The impact of an IPR trade war would be contained and would not damage overall relations.

The U.S. is more important to China than China is to the United States.

Q. Is there an appreciation here of the negative consequences of the March military exercises for China?

In *neibu* papers, you always find positive assessments. A while ago someone at the top said there had been enough discussion of negative consequences of the military exercises and that it was time to move on. It is difficult for people to talk about the negative consequences now.

One dangerous negative consequence of the military exercises is that the exercises removed the basis for the two sides to come to any understanding. The military exercises moved Taiwan from overt to covert pursuit of independence.

There are people in China who are committed to maintaining good Sino-American relations. What the U.S. did damaged their position, however, just as what China did undermined people in the United States wanting better ties.

Q. Are any people here critical of China's March military exercises?

There were people with similar arguments about the negative consequences.

Q. There is a widely accepted assessment in Washington of China's military exercises that maintains that Beijing used a combination of force and diplomacy to successfully achieve a set of Chinese political objectives in the July through December period but that the missile firings near Taiwan's ports in March of this year were counterproductive. According to this view, China miscalculated in the March exercises and paid a high political price. Officials and non-government experts in Washington see at least four negative consequences: 1) Lee Tenghui received a mandate in the election, perhaps 8-10 percentage points higher than he might have received; 2) the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers off China's coast, putting greater clarity to the policy of strategic ambiguity and thus boosting confidence in Taiwan that the U.S. would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of a conflict with the mainland; 3) China's neighbors once again became worried about Chinese intentions and behavior after Beijing had successfully eased their concerns following the Mischief Reef incident; and 4) Secretary Perry's confidence was shaken by the provocative nature of China's missile firings.

Your analysis of the negative impact of China's military exercises is very forceful. You should make it known to top levels here. Maybe it would lead to a reevaluation.

Lee Teng-hui flatly turned down the three links. Even Lee's six points last year showed a healthy tendency. We thought at that time that the prospect for improving cross-Strait relations was improving. We have returned to 1993 in the status of cross-Strait relations--to the period before the Wang-Gu talks began.

Q. Is there any discussion here of flexibility in China's Taiwan policy? It seems outdated from a U.S. perspective.

Two years ago people could talk indirectly about Lee's six points and Jiang's eight points as the basis for moving toward a reconciliation between the two sides of the Strait. Now no one can say this. You can't even raise the six points. So this is a real retrogression in terms of any discussion about China's Taiwan policy.


The National Society for International Relations recently held a conference at the Foreign Affairs College. Local institutions were invited to send representatives and several hundred people attended, including Shen Qurong [President of CICIR]. Ma Zhengang [Deputy Director of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office under Liu Huaqiu] spoke at the meeting. Ma is very honest and down-to-earth--not a typical bureaucrat. In these discussions, some people said that they could find a negative U.S. hand in every issue affecting China's interests--on Taiwan, Tibet, WTO, etc. The only area of cooperation, they said, was in combating crime.

Q. Are there people trying to challenge such views?

They would not say so directly. I compare the situation with the 1950s to show that U.S. policy is not containment. The U.S. does not have the capacity to do something very harmful. The U.S. has differences with all countries.

The Taiwan Institute [of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] is very special. It is not really part of CASS. It is a mixture of Taiban [State Council office of Taiwan affairs] and people from CICIR, with which it has close relations.

Scholars argue whether China really intends to build a strategic relationship with Russia. The term "strategic partnership" was inserted by the Russians at the last minute.


Liu Xiaoming
Director, Department of North American
and Oceanic Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
May 30, 1996

Q. What do you see as the prospects for reaching an IPR agreement?

It depends on the U.S. side. Our position is well known to your side. If the U.S. has the political will, then we will reach an accord. Both sides already have published a retaliation list. The impression on the outside is that we are close to a trade war, but both sides will try to resolve it. Lee Sands is coming on June 6. It seems that the U.S. wants to put some effort into this. We will try to work out a good program for him. As long as the U.S. is not unrealistic in its demands, then there will be no problem.

As you probably know, the U.S. has targeted 4 areas: 1) close factories; 2) law enforcement period; 3) ~~customs area~~; and 4) market access. We have common ground on the first three. You could view the progress so far as half full or half empty. Some factories have already been closed down. We have told the U.S. that China has a market economy. We have to launch a serious investigation into each allegation. There are some legitimate factories and we can't just shut them down based on your say so. Some of them have certificates which might be fake, but nevertheless they have them and have shown them to the central government. The U.S. side says the situation is getting worse.

The last thorny issue is market access. The U.S. has to adopt a realistic approach. Market access was not part of the original agreement. There are cultural differences involved as well. The U.S. has had difficulties entering the French market too. The U.S. is demanding that it be permitted to buy out the factories and set up joint ventures. But this is up to the factories. It is not realistic to think that they can all just be handed over and sold to the U.S. by the Chinese government. The U.S. has to adjust its demands. My colleagues joke that an agreement might be reached on the early morning of June 18.

IPR is under the responsibility of MOFTEC. We have offered our views. In the U.S. the State Department also offers its views to USTR. There is teamwork. But we don't have much room to maneuver.

Q. What arguments are made by those in China who oppose compromising? Is spiritual pollution their main concern?

This is one issue. People hold a traditional view with regard to Western culture. We do import some Western films. We think that it is good for the Chinese people to import some. There is a debate here. Some people don't want Western movies. In the first three areas, we have launched a serious investigation. We don't want to hurt good people. As I said, market access was not part of last year's agreement but was raised by the U.S. side.

Q. What is your assessment of the recent speeches made by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry on U.S. China policy? Do you think that they are motivated by domestic political concerns or represent genuine thinking in the administration?

Both. They are political rhetoric and genuine. As for Clinton's speech, when I read it my first impression was that it is political speech. To renew MFN he has to mobilize his forces. He needs to appeal to public support and defend his China policy. It is under criticism from many people in Congress such as Pelosi, Macke and Dole as well as from politicians like Buchanan. His China policy is a weak point in his campaign for reelection. He switched his position on MFN after his election and he made campaign promises that weren't kept. So China is a concern for him and he doesn't want China to be a campaign issue this time. He is trying to restore a bipartisan consensus on MFN. I think that is OK.

There are also other issues that he raised and then there are also problems. After three and a half years of experience dealing with China, we see an interest in realizing stable relations. Clinton took a strategic perspective and will leave implementation to the operational level. This is a good sign. Christopher proposed regular summits. We don't know the specific terms. Christopher told Qian Qichen last year that he was authorized to invite Jiang to Washington, but this could not be realized. I went to New York with Qian Qichen and there was no discussion of inviting him to Washington. I don't know what Christopher had in mind. It seems that he tried to strike a positive tone in his speech. There are some points that we don't like, of course. Christopher referred to Lee Tenghui as President of Taiwan. He is a senior official, so we pay attention to this. The U.S. also predicates its policy on Taiwan to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. We want to achieve a peaceful resolution, but we can't renounce the use of force.

So the linkage between the U.S. pursuit of a one China policy and the peaceful resolution of Taiwan is more explicitly linked than before. In the past, the U.S. expressed concern about seeing Taiwan resolved peacefully but did not link this to U.S. policy directly. I hope that this does not represent a change in your one China policy. We have expressed our concern to officials in your embassy about some of these points. We are concerned about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Some Congressmen have said that the TRA should supersede the communiqués with China. I know that the Clinton administration opposes this. I don't know how strongly it will resist the pressure from Congress, however. It could do what President Bush did. Because of the election campaign he decided to sell F-16s to Taiwan. I know that Texas was important. Many of his supporters told us later that they thought it was a bad decision.

Clinton also raised TMD in his speech. A State Department official has since said that this is not new and has already been delivered. At first, people in Taiwan were excited. They thought they would be under the U.S. umbrella along with Japan and South Korea. That would be a dangerous development. Others said that Clinton lost his words. We got clarification from the State Department.

Another thing about which we are very concerned is how the U.S. looks at China—as a threat or as a force for peace. Clinton raised this question, but he did not answer it. This is different from in the past. Another thing that is different is the words used to characterize what kind of China the U.S. supports. Since Clinton only asked the question, this has cast doubts about how the U.S. views China. The words used to be strong, prosperous and open China is in U.S. interests and China is a force for peace. This time Clinton said secure instead of strong. I think that secure has a dual meaning.

Q. My own view is that "secure" has a positive connotation. The U.S. wants a China that feels secure, not a China that feels threatened. If China feels threatened, then it will be more likely to build up its military power and engage in behavior that is contrary to U.S. interests. If China is weak, then it will feel insecure. So in my mind secure encompasses the word strong. It is politically difficult to say that the U.S. wants a strong China now. Besides, American officials are tired of China complaining that we are insincere when we use the word "strong" and don't really want a strong China. Use of the term "secure" demonstrates that the U.S. cares about China's perceptions of its security, not merely the reality. Thus, if the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance makes China feel insecure, this is not in U.S. interests. Regarding Clinton not answering the question he posed, I don't think that it indicates that he doubts that China is a force for peace, but rather that he was noting that such a question exists in the minds of others. I think that the speech indicated that his view was that China is not currently a threat to stability.

I hope that when [National Security Adviser] Lake visits he can give us the same explanation. If it is a technical problem, then we have no reason to be concerned about it. But some people in the U.S. might think that a strong China is not good for Japan or U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, especially after the March military exercises. The other meaning of secure is to ensure that China cannot pose a threat to the U.S. This is the negative side. We can press Lake to explain the meaning to us.

In conducting our military exercises, we tried to send a signal that our military can accomplish reunification if it is called upon. Some people in the U.S. say that China tried to invade Taiwan and that China poses a threat to the security of Taiwan, to the Asia-Pacific and to U.S. interests.

Q. What would a strategic dialogue between Chinese and American leaders include? What topics should be addressed during the visits by Lake and Slocombe? Do you think that the Chi Haotian visit can be rescheduled for this year?

You raised the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S.-Japan alliance has caused some concern in Asia. After the Cold War many people think that the alliance is a legacy of the Cold War and say that the reason for its existence has gradually diminished. But instead, the alliance has been strengthened. After the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the U.S. is looking for a new enemy. I have talked to some Americans who say that the search for an enemy is underway and there is an effort to mobilize people behind this. Visits like yours are important.

I went with Liu Huaqiu to the United States and participated in the talks with Lake. Lake regarded our discussions as the first strategic dialogue between our two countries since the end of the Cold War. The talks lasted 8 hours. But since then there have been no ongoing discussions or exchange of views. There has been no follow up. We have only focused on differences—the ring magnets, for example. I have worked very hard to put that issue behind us. But it shows that there is no mutual trust. The U.S. doesn't believe us. We say that the government did not know about the transfer and they don't believe us. U.S. concerns are legitimate. We have concerns as well. I was there when Christopher told Qian that there would be no Lee Tenghui visit. He said that he had failed to convince any Senator to support him, but this is still no excuse. We need to restore mutual trust.

How strongly does Clinton believe in this relationship? We don't know how much input he has. I told my colleagues that if Nixon was alive he might say that we need a state visit. We lost an important opportunity last year to achieve a visit and resolve problems. If we had done so, we might not have had a crisis in the Taiwan strait. There is no confidence at the top or even at the working levels. At summit meetings we hear encouraging things, but then a day later we don't

know if the U.S. can deliver. We have no high expectations in a U.S. presidential election year. But the U.S. has made promises to do some things. Maybe we can prevent the ups and downs and stabilize relations. If there is no IPR agreement and we have a trade war, then I don't know how relations will develop. That's not our problem. The ball is in the U.S. court. Slocombe's visit will be important. It depends how the visit comes out. Maybe it could pave the way for a visit to the U.S. by Chi Haotian. The agenda of Slocombe's visit will be both bilateral military ties and security issues. Kent Weidemann will accompany him. So it depends on how the discussions go. We will see if the two sides reach an understanding.

Q. Secretary Perry proposed in his speech that a multilateral defense dialogue be convened in the region. There is interest in DOD in mini-dialogues such as just among Northeast Asian states. What do you think of his proposal?

First, we have to look into your proposal. Second, we are cautious. You can relay back to your side that the trust issue is key. Taiwan occupies an important place in this. It regards China's sovereignty. Taiwan was returned to China after World War II. History resulted in Chiang Kai Shek fleeing to Taiwan and we lost it. It is a legacy of history. It is a thorn in our side. This not well understood by Americans. For example, Jim Lilley says that China plays with this issue and uses it to get leverage over the U.S. That is why we took the Lee Tenghui visit to the U.S. so seriously. We not only made noise--we recalled our ambassador and took other steps to show you that we really care about this issue. Clinton seems to now have a better sense about this. Gradually an understanding is being developed in Congress as well. Johnston, Feinstein and Nunn have come to a better understanding.

IPR is a technical issue. It is not a big deal and won't upset the whole relationship if no agreement is reached. If we can manage it well, then all the better. The U.S. has economic disputes with many countries. It would deal a blow to our relations. U.S.-Japanese relations can withstand this kind of blow better. U.S.-Chinese relations are very fragile and can't easily withstand it, but we will try to manage it. Taiwan is very sensitive. The current U.S. administration now has a better understanding. It handled the sending of a U.S. delegation to Taiwan for Lee Tenghui's inauguration in a cautious way. In principle, we oppose the sending of any delegation, of course. We expect that the U.S. will be cautious in the future--about the Olympics, for example. The upgrading of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is not in accordance with the spirit or the letter of our August 1982 Communiqué.

Q. The U.S. has been very cautious this year about arms transfers to Taiwan. What are you concerned about?

We are concerned about the large quantity of Stingers--this is something new. There is also the upgraded Patriot. There has been an increase in quality and quantity of sales. The U.S. side has no sincerity to find a final solution.

In interagency meetings, I can't defend U.S. actions on the ring magnets. They are not on any trigger list nor are they subject to IAEA safeguards. People compare this to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, such as the F-16s. It is hard to sell internally. Some people say that we aren't strong enough. They say that if the U.S. and China were to change places, then China would have imposed sanctions on the U.S. for its sales to Taiwan. In Nixon's book, he wrote that early next century China might be so strong that it could link human rights with MFN renewal for the U.S.

Q. I think that the recent events got the attention of top U.S. leaders to focus on China.

Charles Freeman really got the administration's attention. People in the U.S. read what was published in the *New York Times*. Gingrich used his words to prove that there is a threat from China to the United States. Freeman knows full well that China has a No First Use policy regarding nuclear weapons. Our message is that the U.S. should support our NFU pledge.

Will Clinton win the election? What do you think of the role of a third party. Some say that Jack Kemp has Ross Perot's support. Might he run with Powell? Is that possible?

Q. It seems from the speeches by both Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. on China that there is an emerging convergence of views between the two parties. What about attitudes in China toward the U.S.—is there greater convergence here on policy toward the U.S.?

Our systems are different. Foreign policy is not for public debate. We do have think tanks and scholars. There is more consensus in our country that good relations between the U.S. and China is in Chinese interests. Having said that, however, it is not a very strong consensus. It is not so much that there is anti-Americanism, but there is resentment toward the U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth and Michael Pillsbury told me how strongly young scholars in China say that the U.S. is doing things detrimental to China's interests. In policy circles people have a more balanced view of the U.S.

There is a debate over how to handle our relations with the U.S. MOFTEC has greater resentment than the MFA. The Foreign Ministry is more balanced—for example on the IPR issue and on the ring magnet issue. We have to work better to avoid sanctions on IPR. People have the impression here that China is reactive, not pro-active. They see problems that have been created by the U.S. side. Maybe you think that problems have been created by the Chinese side. We need more discussion. The lack of dialogue has resulted in not enough mutual trust.

Engagement should be *active*. It is a good slogan, but we don't see enough. The first half of the year many Chinese officials have visited the U.S. Who has been here from your side? Christopher went to Syria 13 times. Last time he said that this was his sixth meeting with Qian within a one year term and the thirteenth meeting within three years. I whispered to my American friends that only once had they met in China. So there isn't much evidence to support your statements that the U.S. attaches importance to our relations. You don't want to pay the price. Christopher went to Japan last month. He could have flown an extra two hours to China and met with our leaders. We like to travel to new places, so it was OK to meet at The Hague. I got to go to Rome on the way there and had a stopover in Moscow on the way back. It was my first visit to both places. But our relationship pays the price.

High-level visits can solve a lot of problems. It cuts through the bureaucracy and forces people to make decisions. Then we can avoid a tug-of-war among our agencies. We have the impression that lower-level bureaucracies have determined some U.S. policies, for example on human rights. They have their own priority. There is no coordination. IPR, proliferation—different groups have their own agenda. Leaders can set an agenda and give guidance to the bureaucrats. Ambassador Sasser says that the dog should wag the tail, not the tail wag the dog. Big dogs always wag tails.

Q. What will be the legacy for our relationship of the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers off China's coast in March?


This depends on developments. If U.S.-Chinese relations gradually normalize . . . we don't want to rock the boat in the Strait. We want the status quo. Gradually we might remove the impressions from the minds of people. If the trend goes in the opposite direction, then people will say that the U.S. says one thing and does another. So it depends on the future of our relations. I hope that China's message was received seriously.

Q. We were told by some people on this visit that Perry's words and actions prove that he was never a real friend of China's.

Chinese people like to forgive. We were very angry at Bush. But after his presidency he has visited here many times. He is now a frequent flyer to China. His office asked us for a multiple entry visa. We told them that we can't do this, but the door is always wide open for him. We know that Perry is one of the supporters of U.S.-China relations. People are not happy about his statements. Maybe he has to say these things. But he understood China's culture better than other cabinet members. We know he was under pressure due to John Lewis, but I don't know how much is due to domestic politics. We know that he is eager to get Chi Haotian to visit the United States and supports expanding military relations. I was in that meeting with Liu Huaqiu and Perry--there were tears in Perry's eyes. We have to give him time to recover. I hope that he will come back here as a friend.

Q. Can you give us some suggestions about who to talk to on environmental issues? We are thinking about setting up some meetings on our next visit to talk about this.

You know about our new bilateral commission on sustainable development. The head of the Chinese delegation put together an interagency team. It included COSTIND, the Bureau of Environmental Protection, the Coal Mining Industry, MOFTEC and MFA. We had good discussions in the first round. We haven't yet scheduled the next round, but it seems to me that both sides want to. It will be on a reciprocal basis, so the next session should be in Beijing. Both sides have the same interests. You should have your hosts get in touch with Jin Xiaoming--his first name is the same as mine--at COSTIND.



Yang Qiming
Retired Senior Colonel
Former assistant Army attache in U.S.
May 29, 1996

Q. What was the reaction here to the deployment of two carriers to the Taiwan area during China's military exercises and missile firings in March?

Some people talked about the possibility of war. But it was only a show of force, just as China's military exercises were a show of force. The U.S. wanted to tell China that it was concerned the exercises could get out of hand. The missile firings were intended to show people on Taiwan that we can hit the eastern side of the island that is out of reach of our aircraft and navy and thus that we could conduct a complete blockade.

I think people in Japan and Southeast Asia must now think they have to pay more attention to the "China threat." They may not talk about it but they will think about it. People may say one thing and mean another. When China invaded Vietnam, the U.S. said that all foreign forces should withdraw, including Chinese forces from Vietnam as well as Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, but at the same time, the U.S. gave us satellite photos of Vietnamese forces. The Japanese especially are people who will say one thing and think another.

Some retired PLA officers criticized the military exercises as too expensive. I personally think that they will result in Taiwan pressing for more weapons from the U.S. and other countries, including early warning and anti-submarine capabilities.

There are several points to keep in mind about the exercises. First, they have to be evaluated in the context of the leadership succession. That is Jiang Zemin's number one concern. China has never had a successful succession. If you don't view the military exercises from this perspective, you cannot fully understand them. Jiang can't be seen as weak. The next 1-2 years will be critical for Jiang. He has to show that he is in control. Now he is improving relations with many other countries and trying to show that he is in control of foreign affairs. He also has to be in control of the PLA. He is trying to get older generals to retire and put his own people in place. This is a critical time for China and Jiang has to pay attention to preparing for the succession. Every major decision that Jiang makes, this is what is in his mind.

Second, only war-tested PLA soldiers have been respected in the past and have gotten promoted largely on this basis. The PLA supported the exercises because for those who have not been war-tested, they could become exercise-tested. This will be a new means of gaining others' respect.

Third, China wanted to show Taiwan its determination and warn Lee Teng-hui not to go too far. Fourth, China wanted to display a show of force to warn the U.S. not to get involved in the Taiwan problem.

I was surprised that the U.S. sent a second aircraft carrier. The U.S. knew that China would not use force. I think that the U.S. wanted to have its own show of force.

I expect that there will be some distance between China and the U.S. for a few more years.

Q. How do you think that China's objectives in developing a military relationship with the U.S. have changed?

The primary concern in the Cold War was to counter the threat from the Soviet Union. Now that has disappeared. In the past China also wanted to obtain high-tech military equipment. Now it can get a lot of equipment from Russia. The Chinese side still wants to sustain a dialogue with the U.S. military. Contacts are seen as useful to keep stability. Our side is just not as eager as it was in the past.

Xiong Guangkai is considered to be very capable and competent. He knows his work. Unlike other senior generals in China, he does not come from a Long-March-steeped family. Other Chinese generals have spent years in the field and have been war-tested. Xiong is an intellectual. He has to try harder to get promoted than some others do. He is known to have curried favor with people to get promoted. Xiong used to be close to Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing. Some people that he should be punished along with the Yangs. People below him don't like him very much.

Xiong is from Shanghai, as is Jiang Zemin, and he has tried to get close to Jiang. So far he has been successful. Jiang really likes him. I have heard that they sometimes have hour-long conversations on the telephone. It may not matter much if others don't like him if he remains close to Jiang.

Xiong was the number 2 military official in charge of the military exercises. That shows that the foreign component was very important to the leadership.

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government over the budget dispute was interpreted in China as indicating that the United States had serious economic difficulties.


Colonel Li Qinggong

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May 28, 1996

[We opened with a presentation of an analysis of China's military exercises, contrasting the success of the policy in achieving political objectives from July through the end of the year with the counterproductive impact of the March exercises and missile firings.]

Zhang Tuosheng: Before the military exercises, American military people said that the PLA did not have the military capability to defeat Taiwan. I noticed an American article written after the exercises, however, that said Taiwan can resist China for only a week and after that it would be defeated.

I agree with most of the points in your assessment. On the positive side, I have three points:

1) The military exercises and missile firings showed that China has the ability to influence Taiwan's economic and social stability. Using force is the last thing China wants to do, but in the future if Lee Teng-hui wants to visit the U.S., Japan and other countries and to continue his splittism policy, China has a lot of military options. China launched missiles near Taiwan's ports to simulate a blockade of the ports. Maybe it would be good to do it again to influence Taiwan's policy. We can warn the independence forces.

2) Though the U.S. sent carriers to the region and Japan said something, the reaction of the international community was not bad. If we targeted missiles near the Philippines or some other countries, the situation would be quite different. It means that most countries see Taiwan as part of China. Japan's attitude is different than the U.S. reaction.

3) We found that the U.S. really does not want to be involved in military action in this region even though it sent two carriers. Through the Liu-Lake talks, the U.S. and China knew each other's bottom line. If the U.S. really knows the determination of China to safeguard its sovereignty, it will be a very good thing for security in the Asia-Pacific region. It will discourage the Taiwan independence movement and maintain the status quo. It is good to keep the status quo because we are very confident about our economic growth and the development of other attributes of power.

A negative consequence of the military exercises and missile firings that you did not mention was that they were very useful for the U.S. and Japan [to consolidate their revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance]. It also exacerbated anti-Communist sentiment in Taiwan.

On balance, the outcome was more positive than negative.

Q. What is your assessment of why the U.S. sent the two carrier battlegroups to the Taiwan area?

Zhang Tuosheng: One reason was to show Congress the administration's resolve. The main reason, however, was to demonstrate to U.S. allies that the U.S. was committed to fulfilling its responsibilities in this region. I don't think the U.S. was prepared to fight a war with China.

Q. Did you expect the U.S. to send two carriers?

Zhang Tuosheng: Many people thought maybe the U.S. would send one carrier, but they did not expect the second carrier. We think one was enough. Why the second? Some people think that Perry feared that he would be criticized as too soft if he did not send two.

Q. How do you see the future course of Taiwan and specifically how do you assess Lee Teng-hui's May 20 inaugural speech? If there is nothing new from Lee, what course of action would China take? Will it resume military exercises in the Strait?

Li Qinggong: In comparing the May 20th speech with Lee's previous speeches, I don't think there are any significant differences. The May 20th speech only re-emphasized Lee's stand and attitude toward the Mainland. Chinese leading bodies have a deep understanding of Lee Teng-hui's attitude and policy. I don't think he will change in the future, although he used new terms. So from this viewpoint, China's policy toward Taiwan will continue as before.

I had a deep feeling after China's military exercises that through the exercises the highest bodies in China—the Politburo and military leaders—had a deep-rooted commitment to take any risk to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.

Why did the U.S. send two carriers? This situation was caused by a misunderstanding by President Clinton. He did not have a deep understanding of China's determination on the issue. Through talks with Liu Huaqiu, U.S. leaders came to understand what China really means. I think China will take any risk and I am for that.

Q. You said China's policy will continue. Will military exercises have to be upgraded? There is concern in the United States that China did not want to scale back the exercises because of the need to increase political pressure on Taiwan and might feel compelled to use greater military pressure next time.

Wu Baiyi: It fully depends on how far Taiwan leaders will push to expand their international space. To what extent our military measures are increased will depend on Taiwan.

Q. Could China have achieved its political goals without firing missiles so close to Taiwan?

Wu Baiyi: China has more room for political maneuver. The missile firings showed we have this flexibility.

Li Qinggong: Before China laid down the plan for the military exercises, Chinese leaders had certain political objectives. They did not think Taiwan leaders would postpone the election. The political objective of Chinese leaders was to influence the Taiwan people to think that if they made the wrong choice, the Mainland would be determined to use force.

Wu Baiyi: We wanted to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. side learned that Beijing could control the situation--that the U.S. should not worry that China would lose control.

Li Qinggong: China used military exercises to determine what would be the reaction of the international community, including the United States, as well as Taiwan. The exercises had no real military objective. They were not used to shield China's strength. With these military exercises, China did not show a very strong military capability. We were only trying to test international reaction.

Q. Is there any sentiment to adjust China's Taiwan policy? An argument could be made that Beijing should deal with Lee Teng-hui because in four years you could get someone much worse.

Zhang Tuosheng: Many scholars think that after Lee Teng-hui we can get someone better--that Lee was educated in Japan and that younger leaders were educated in the United States. Lee wants to make possible things that seem impossible. Other leaders may be more rational. He only has three years. If he continues his wrong policy, China cannot allow him to go too far. If he really hopes to improve relations, we would be glad to welcome him in Beijing or for Jiang Zemin to go to Taiwan. But at this time, his speeches are full of empty phrases.

Q. What is China looking for Lee to do to make possible resumption of the Wang-Gu talks?

Zhang Tuosheng: It is impossible to resume the Wang-Gu talks right now. Lee played a dirty trick. He agreed to hold the second Wang-Gu talks and then visited the United States. If China were so eager to talk, it would have accepted the Lee Teng-hui visit to the United States. So many scholars think if we resume the talks, they should include political as well as administrative issues, for example, preparing for talks between top leaders. Lee wants talks just to create a peaceful atmosphere so that he can visit Japan and Western Europe. He will be friendly to us then stab us in the back. If there is no substantial progress, then why should we go ahead with the talks. So the Chinese government has a "wait and see" attitude toward Taiwan. The situation in the Taiwan Strait has relaxed since March, but the issue is still there. The U.S. government has agreed not to invite Lee this year. The U.S. also agreed to sell Taiwan advanced weapons. Dole called for Taiwan's participation in a TMD program for the region.

Q. I think that the U.S. has been rather cautious in selling arms to Taiwan this year and Taipei is not satisfied with the weapons the U.S. has agreed to sell Taiwan. At what point will the Chinese government decide that it can no longer "wait and see" and must take action against Taiwan or offer a new initiative on the issue?

Zhang Tuosheng: Several top Chinese leaders have just returned from abroad, so it is too early for China to respond.

Wu Baiyi: I am curious at what point the Chinese government will have a new position on Taiwan.

Zhang Tuosheng: China will always have two positions--reunify with the Mainland and do not push for international space. I don't worry about Taiwan's push into the UN--Lee cannot do it. I am more concerned about damaging our ties with the U.S., Japan and other countries.

The revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance is destabilizing. I agree with Kissinger that a balance is important. Japan, the United States, and China should have a relatively stable relationship. Now the U.S.-Japan relationship has been strengthened but Sino-American relations are strained.

This is very dangerous. So I think that it will be very important if Chi Haotian can do something to improve the Sino-American military relationship.

Li Qinggong: I agree with Zhang on Chinese policy makers' ideas. After the military exercises and Lee Teng-hui's May 20 speech, Chinese leaders are not concentrating on the Taiwan issue because their stand and policy on Taiwan is clear. Although they may take more flexible measures on Taiwan, their basic policy will not change in the near future.

Chinese leaders are now concentrating on two issues. First, they are seeking to improve the international environment for China. They are going to Africa and Europe. They are trying to counter the influence of Taiwan by going to Africa. By going to Europe, they are trying to counter the influence of the United States. They don't have to go to Russia to counter anyone. Chinese leaders are concentrating more on economic development than on politics, however. Secondly, they are concentrating on the return of Hong Kong next year. There is much to be dealt with before then. The issues are not so easy to handle. Jiang Zemin met with Hong Kong delegates in Zhuhai. I can see by the speeches of Chinese leaders that the return of Hong Kong will not be easy, especially calming the concerns of people in Hong Kong. So if the return of Hong Kong is successful without too much difficulty, it will be a model for the return of Taiwan. I think that for the rest of the year and next year, Chinese leaders will concentrate on these issues. In the future, China will be more flexible on Taiwan. But strategically it will be based on Jiang Zemin's 8 points and on the one China policy.

Q. What kind of tactical flexibility do you see on Taiwan?

Li Qinggong: We are not so stubbornly committed to military pressure and political blockade of Taiwan. If Taiwan does not go against China's will on visits to Japan, the United States and other countries, then China will not put much pressure on Taiwan. If China is more flexible, Chinese leaders hope that Taiwan will also be more flexible. If Lee Teng-hui keeps on with his policy of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan, then China will not accept it. We want concrete steps to improve Mainland-Taiwan relations.

Zhang Yu: China needs to pay more attention to the people in Taiwan. 75% of them voted for the status quo, not for independence. That was good for Taiwan, China and the United States. There are many forms of pressure. Military pressure is only one form. There is also economic pressure. China could take a different attitude toward investment: if Taiwan is for independence, then Taiwanese investment in China is in jeopardy. Lee Teng-hui would be in a very difficult situation.

Zhang Tuosheng: This will be especially true when Hong Kong is returned to China.

Q. What do you see as the prospects for a Chi Haotian visit to the United States?

Zhang Tuosheng: PLA leaders sincerely hope to improve ties with the United States. Until the last minute when the U.S. declared a change in Chi's invitation, the Chinese delegation had been preparing to visit the United States--a friend of mine was in the delegation. It was canceled for political reasons.

The Sino-American political and economic relationship is very important to the fate of the military relationship. If there is a trade war, for example, I don't think there will be good prospects for a military visit. If top leaders of the two countries can meet, there will be a good military relationship. So an improvement in political relations is essential for developing military ties.

The PLA plays an important role in China but it is firmly controlled by the Party and Jiang Zemin. Foreigners don't understand this. Many doubt that the issue of succession has been solved. Foreigners have said that Jiang Zemin was against military pressure on Taiwan and that the PLA forced political leaders to go along with their demands. But this is quite wrong.

Q. What are the conditions for a Chi visit? Is a Clinton meeting essential?

Zhang Tuosheng: One thing that is important is U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. If some more sophisticated arms are sold to Taiwan, PLA leaders will be very worried.

Li Qinggong: I took part in the preparations for the Chi visit that was canceled. In doing the preparation, we found things we could not resolve, including Sino-American political relations. I don't think that under such political conditions in U.S.-China relations as exist now that it would be appropriate for Chi to visit the United States. I don't think there will be a Chi visit this year. The political atmosphere is not so good.

The second problem is the issue of mutual treatment. Perry met with Jiang Zemin. If Chi visits the United States, a Chi meeting with Clinton will be very important. That is an obstacle in the path of a visit. If Clinton had said clearly that he would meet with him, Chi would be eager to go to the White House.

The third problem is that when ministers meet, they should give each other gifts. China's gift will be a promise—I cannot say what it will be. What gifts will Perry give? We don't know what the U.S. can give.

Q. What does China want?

Li Qinggong: Military sales to Taiwan is one of the key issues. Since these problems have not been solved, Chi's visit will not be possible this year. Because of the elections, Clinton will not want to meet with the Chinese leader who just conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Maybe there can be a Chi visit next year. I don't think you can guarantee a Clinton meeting or gifts from Perry in an election year. We are trying to get information from the United States on these issues, but so far we have not been able to do so.

Zhang Tuosheng: We also want the resumption of some military cooperation, especially relaxation of sanctions on military high-technology exports.

Q. Do you think China would agree to participate in multilateral or trilateral U.S.-Japan-China defense ministers' talks?

Li Qinggong: On multilateral defense minister talks, I don't think China will be strongly against this. I feel that there is a tendency of Chinese military leaders to be eager to go to the outside world but that they meet resistance from the MFA.

Q. The objections are only from the MFA and not from the PLA as well?

Li Qinggong: Most of the military agree. We think that multilateral talks between defense ministers will do good, not bad, for China.

Q. Why would the MFA oppose such talks?

Li Qinggong: I don't know. MFA people cannot control the dialogue. They often don't understand military terms and issues. Do you have a firm statement by China against this?

Q. Joe Nye did not get a response when he proposed this idea last November. There is a sense that China prefers bilateral security talks--that Beijing fears pressure on China in a multilateral fora.

Zhang Tuosheng: China's attitude toward high-level multilateral security talks has become more positive, for example, toward the ARF. A few years ago such an idea was opposed.

Li Qinggong: It may not be China but some ASEAN countries that are against this. They said they don't want a multilateral dialogue with defense ministers because the U.S. would take the leading role, not ASEAN.

Q. Trilateral U.S.-China-Japan security talks would be the most important.

Li Qinggong: Russia would be unhappy if it were left out. The U.S., Japan, China and Russia are the big powers in Northeast Asia. Russian military leaders would feel angry. They would feel they were being excluded from security issues in the region. The U.S. should consider the Russians in any multilateral security defense talks.

Zhang Tuosheng: The U.S. and Japan have very close security relations. Only after the United States and Japan repair their security relationship can they have trilateral defense talks. But this could lead to Japan and the U.S. acting together to deal with China. We cannot accept this.

Li Qinggong: I think such a trilateral dialogue is in China's interest. We need a three step process, however. First, hold U.S.-Japan-China non-governmental discussions. Second, concrete work by lower-level military officials. Finally, defense minister talks. For the first step, FISS could arrange the China part of the trilateral dialogue. The U.S. and Japan would have to establish non-government organizations on their sides. If we try to rush directly to the third step, the Chinese military leadership would just take it into consideration. If we take all the right preparatory steps, we can have a report to Chinese leaders from FISS.

This is not a bad suggestion to make the idea of trilateral defense talks into a reality.

Q. What do you see as China's objectives in developing military ties with the United States?

Li Qinggong: As far as I understand, there are two reasons for Chinese leaders to develop military with the United States: 1) to promote political relations; and 2) to obtain more sophisticated military technology from the United States. We can have a wide range of military cooperation not involving military technology such as on peacekeeping operations.

Return Reception

TIME: 27 June; 1900-2030

PLACE: DEFATT BG
Byrnes home

PARTICIPANTS:

USD(P) and full delegation; DEFATT BG Byrnes and members of his attaché team; LTG Xiong, representatives of the PRC MND Foreign Affairs Bureau, and various other PRC representatives.

SCENARIO:

You will host this return reception in honor of LTG Xiong. This will be a chance to wrap-up your visit on a positive note. The Byrnes residence will provide a comfortable atmosphere for either casual or serious dialogue. You may also use the reception as an opportunity to address issues that warrant follow-up from previous discussions.

At an appropriate point, you should make a toast in honor of LTG Xiong and the PLA.

Suggested toast follows

TOAST FOR USD(P) RECEPTION

NOTE: YOU SHOULD OFFER A VERY BRIEF TOAST AT THE END OF THE EVENING

FIRST, ON BEHALF OF EVERYONE HERE TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A TOAST TO MRS. MARIE BYRNES WHO PLANNED AND PUT TOGETHER THIS EVENT. MRS. BYRNES HAS CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS THROUGH HER TIME AND ENERGIES, AND ALL OF US OWE HER OUR GRATITUDE. TOAST

GENERAL SHE-UNG, ON BEHALF OF ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF MY DELEGATION, LET ME THANK YOU AND THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU FOR THE OUTSTANDING ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE FOR WHAT HAS BEEN A VERY PRODUCTIVE VISIT TO BEIJING.

I KNOW THAT THE CHINESE HAVE A SAYING THAT A GOOD BEGINNING MEANS THAT YOU ARE HALFWAY TO SUCCESS. IF WE CONSIDER THE RECENT AGREEMENTS AND VARIOUS SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUES IN THE WEEKS AHEAD AS THE REAL BEGINNING OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN 1996, THEN WE SHOULD BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GREATER SUCCESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN, GENERAL SHE-UNG, IN THE FUTURE. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR AN EXCELLENT, MEMORABLE VISIT TO YOUR GREAT NATION. GAHN-BAYY!

NOTE: YOU SHOULD STAND IN THE HALLWAY AS THE GUESTS DEPART AND SHAKE HANDS WITH EACH OF THEM.

Departure from Beijing Airport

TIME: 28 June; 0730

PLACE: Beijing Airport

SCENARIO:

You will be depart the Kempinski hotel for the Beijing airport at 0630. You will travel to the airport in the DATT's sedan. PLA General Zhan ("JOHN") and several PLA staff officers will be at the airport to see you off. You will depart via military aircraft for Tokyo at approximately 0730.

OUR ISSUES:

Express final thanks to BG Byrnes for his efforts in making the arrangements for your visit. You can inform General Zhan that you were pleased with the results of your visit to China and are looking forward continuing to play a role in the Sino-American bilateral military relationship.

PRC ISSUES:

General Zhan will wish you well and express thanks to you for making the visit. He will express the hope that China and the United States can build upon your visit to improve the bilateral relationship.

Memorandum for Correspondents

Under Secretary of Defense Walter B. Slocombe will visit the People's Republic of China from June 25 to 28 1996. During his trip he will discuss a range of global and regional security issues of mutual concern as well as bilateral military topics. Mr. Slocombe will be hosted in China by a senior PLA officer; and meet with representatives from the PLA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others. Included in Mr. Slocombe's delegation will be representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the NSC.

Press Guidance for USD(P) trip to China

Q&A

Q: Why is USD(P) traveling to China at this time?

A: As part of our overall engagement strategy with China it is important to maintain dialogue with the PLA and the Chinese Government at all levels. We view such contacts as crucial to the development of better mutual understanding, and contributing to Asia-Pacific regional security.

Q: What does he hope to accomplish?

A: USD(P)'s trip to Beijing is supportive of the Administration's efforts to conduct senior level dialogue with China on a range of issues. During USD(P)'s stay in Beijing he will have a frank exchange of views with his interlocutors on a variety of military and security issues to which both sides attach importance.

Q: Does this visit mean tensions over recent exercises have subsided?

A: The recent exercises have concluded and we are encouraged by the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. We continue to believe that the differences between the PRC and Taiwan must be resolved by the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait. Our abiding concern is that resolution come about peacefully and we urge resumption of dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan. USD(P) will communicate our views and interests while in Beijing.

Q: Will USD(P) talk to the Chinese about MOD Chi coming to the United States?

A: Secretary Perry would like to see Minister Chi's visit to the United States rescheduled. We hope that conditions will allow such a visit sometime in the near future.

Q: Will USD(P) talk to the Chinese about Taiwan? IPR? Human Rights? Hong Kong reversion? Proliferation? Recent AK-47 issue?

A: USD(P) will talk to the Chinese on a broad range of topics. We are currently developing an agenda with the Chinese and will not rule out any subject.



#2030

NNNN



Suggestions or contributions should be send to:
Policy Automation or call 693-4063.
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